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D

ESPITE frequent incantations of the federalism mantra' over
the last century and a half, the Supreme Court has developed
an aspect of its constitutional jurisprudence, the dormant Commerce Clause,2 that arguably has diminished states' rights while significantly advancing the power of the federal judiciary. By
recognizing a constitutional principle which is not found in the text
of the charter, but is said to flow from the document's negative inferences, the Court may be seen as significantly altering a federal
system delicately balanced by the framers.
Over the years, numerous state and local laws have been invalidated by judicial decisions grounded in this unwritten "dormant"
or "negative" Commerce Clause.3 Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has been generally accepted as it has evolved in this
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University. A.B., 1968 Dickinson College; J.D.,
1971, Duke. The author expresses his appreciation to Rodney L. Bean, J.D., 1992,
West Virginia University, for his research assistance.
I As one reads and attempts to absorb the myriad -cases involving judges' conflicting
views of how American constitutional federalism should and does work, one is struck
by the almost religious fervor of the judicial rhetoric. With regard to the issues of
federalism discussed herein, it has been suggested that, at times, the invocation of federalism principles is based more on ritual than on conviction. See, e.g. Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 560 (1985) (Powell, J. dissenting) ("Despite some genuflecting in the Court's opinion to the concept of federalism, today's
decision effectually reduces federalism to meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the commerce clause.") (criticizing the majority's overruling of National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides, in pertinent part: "The Congress shall have Power
...[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes." While the courts and commentators have used both "dormant" and "negative" in this context, for the sake of convenience the term "dormant
Commerce Clause" will be used below.
3 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 401-41
(2d ed. 1988).
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century.4
Recently, the doctrinal basis of the dormant Commerce Clause
has been questioned by commentators.5 From the bosom of the
Court itself emerged as simple and forthright a rejection of long
ingrained constitutional dogma as may be imagined. In Tyler Pipe
Industry v. Washington State Department of Revenue,6 Justice
Scalia observed:
The fact is that in the 114 years since the doctrine of the negative
Commerce Clause was formally adopted by the Court, and in the
50 years prior to that in which it was alluded to in various dicta
of the Court, our applications of the doctrine have, not to put too
fine a point on the matter, made no sense. 7
As explained below, dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is
founded upon explicit power granted to Congress by the Commerce
Clause.' Whether this doctrine is an appropriate and legitimate
companion to the congressional power to regulate commerce or,
4 As noted below, there have been members of the Court who have rejected the notion of judicial power derived from unwritten negative implications of Commerce
Clause text. See infra text accompanying note 110.
5 See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J.
425, 427-28; 484-85 (1982); Sam Kalen, Reawakening The Dormant Commerce Clause
in its First Century, U. DAYTON L. REV. 417, 420-21 (1988); Henry P. Monaghan, The
Supreme Court 1974 Term, Foreword. Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1, 10-17 (1975); Robert A. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on
State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31
WAYNE L. REV. 885, 998-1000 (1985). See generally Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too Much-An Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 47 (1981); James M. O'Fallon, The Commerce Clause: A Theoretical
Comment, 61 OR. L. REV. 395 (1982); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The
Dormant Commerce Clause and the ConstitutionalBalance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 569; Mark V. Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L.
REV. 125.
6483 U.S. 232 (1987).
7 Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259-60
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Case of the State Freight
Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299, 319 (1852); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 15-16, (1824); 22 U.S. at 2528, 30-33 (Johnson, J., concurring in judgment)). Justice Scalia quotes from a recent
work of David Currie who concludes in a slightly more pointed fashion that "[fin doctrinal terms the Court's efforts in this field can be described only as a disaster." DAVID
D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED

YEARS 1789-1888, at 342 (1985). While Justice Scalia's criticism of the efficacy of the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in Tyler Pipe was severe, in subsequent cases involving that doctrine, he has failed to press this view. Indeed, in the more recent dormant Commerce Clause cases, Justice Scalia has joined in opinions whose holdings rely
on the doctrine. See Mark V. Tushnet, Scalia and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A
Foolish Formalism?, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1771 (1991).
8 The Court implies a corollary judicial power to invalidate state law from the dele-
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rather, a judicial interpretation of the Constitution that "makes no
sense" is examined in this Article from several perspectives. The
parallel development of intrusive judicial review under dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine9 will be contrasted to the extreme deference given legislative judgments under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses. Second, a comparison will be made between
pro-active application of the dormant Commerce Clause theory and
the model of judicial restraint contained in the Court's modern approach to general federal common law and to the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
Next, by way of example, dormant Commerce Clause theory is
tested in the context of a state's right to protect its environment and
barriers to vindication of such rights erected by dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. The apparent elevation of an individual and
corporate right of free trade over other important constitutional values is examined as well." ° By analyzing judicial application of the
dormant Commerce Clause to a somewhat unlikely sounding "outof-state trash" controversy,"' it is possible to observe the impact of
the doctrine on the federal system as it exists today in theory and in
practice. 12

I conclude that when judges assume the responsibility of regulating commerce in the absence of legislative direction, they take
power not only from the states but from the people as well. In placgated congressional power to regulate interstate commerce even though Congress has
taken no pre-emptive or regulatory action pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
9 The history of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has been ably chronicled
elsewhere. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 212-309 (12th ed. 1991);
FRANCIS R. RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OVER COMMERCE (1937); TRIBE,
supra note 3, at 401-41; John B. Sholley, The Negative Implication of the Commerce
Clause, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 556 (1936). That interesting history will only be summarized
below.
I°See Dennis v. Higgins, III S. Ct. 865 (1991).
11See infra section III. The environmental protection issue examined below focuses
on attempts to deal with a virtual tidal wave of millions of tons of garbage flowing
across state lines by truck and rail. Attempts to identify disposal sites have triggered
intense and emotional responses in communities targeted as garbage dumps for urban
wastes. See, e.g., Keith Schneider, Rules Forcing Towns to Pick Big New Dumps at Big
Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1992, at IA; Stuart Vincent, LI's Landfill Stink Reaches
Illinois, NEWSDAY, Feb. 28, 1991, at 26.
12 See discussion infra section III. As discussed below, in a decision rendered when
little recognition of the gravity of this out-of-state trash problem was apparent across
the country, the Supreme Court invalidated a New Jersey statute that flatly banned the
importation of garbage from beyond state borders. The Court's dormant Commerce
Clause decision in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), has effectively blocked most subsequent state attempts to regulate importation of huge quantities
of environmentally degrading wastes from outside state boundaries.
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ing inordinate weight on economic rights of individuals and corporations while giving short shrift to principles of federalism and the
structural integrity of constitutional governance, the Court has engaged in a form of judicial activism that can ultimately undermine
its own authority.
Looking to restore the constitutional balance of power intended
by the framers, I make suggestions for modifying Commerce Clause
jurisprudence in a way that aligns Congress, the courts, and the
states in more appropriate positions to vindicate the interests which
federalism was intended to advance.
I
DEVELOPMENT OF DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
ANALYSIS:

THE STRICT SCRUTINY MODEL

Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power
"To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." 3 Neither this language nor any other constitutional
provision explicitly limits state legislation which may interfere with
interstate commerce, however. The courts have recognized these
limits as flowing by negative implication from the affirmative grant
of congressional power to regulate commerce. It is by way of such
negative inferences that Supreme Court decisions have, for a century and a half, limited the scope of what states might do. 4
No direct history exists which can enlighten the intent of the
framers regarding the explicit commerce power delegated to Congress. 5 Historians and the Supreme Court have inferred from the
economic chaos attendant governance under the Articles of Confederation that the Commerce Clause was intended (1)to eliminate
trade barriers, tariffs, and economic conflict between the states, and
to (2) provide the national government with adequate power to deal
effectively with the economic problems of a unified national
art. I, § 8.
It is interesting to note that these judicially crafted limits on state power draw
inspiration from negative inferences derived from a positive constitutional grant of
power to Congress and thus are always subject to congressional revision. Congress may
enact legislation which allows states to discriminate or otherwise burden certain types of
commerce between and among the states. See TRIBE, supra note 3, at 521-28; see also
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (Congress may enact a federal law
which allows state enactments viewed as discriminatory against or placing an undue
burden on interstate commerce).
15H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-35 (1949).
13 U.S. CONST.
14

Trashing the Constitution

market. 16
A.

Early Approaches

Early interpretations of the Commerce Clause contained two
conflicting perspectives. The view espoused by Madisonians held
that the states had no power to regulate a subject of interstate commerce; only Congress could undertake such regulation.17 In Gibbons v. Ogden," Chief Justice Marshall, a proponent of a strong
central government, embraced Madison's view that Article I, Section 8 granted Congress exclusive power to regulate commerce.
Marshall did not go so far as to contend that the Constitution prohibited every state or local legislative initiative, however. In Gibbons, the Court distinguished the power to regulate commerce from
the subject of such regulation. 9 Thus, while the states could not
regulate interstate commerce, their legislation could impact upon
commerce to a certain extent without necessarily being held
unconstitutional.
The Madisonian-Marshall approach, however, seemed too strict a
limit on state sovereignty for Chief Justice Taney and others. They
asserted that states were not restricted by the Commerce Clause
from enacting legislation unless there was a conflict with a measure
enacted by Congress.2 ° Both strands of Commerce Clause interpretation left their mark on Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 2 The
Madisonian perspective supported a suspicious view of state action
burdening commerce or implicating economic protectionism. The
Taney position held that states should have the freedom to regulate
and incidentally impact interstate commerce, unless a subject of
truly national concern was involved.2 2
Conflict between Madisonian and anti-Madisonian interpreta16See Eule, supra note 5, at 429; RIBBLE, supra note 9, at 30-31; Sedler, supra note
5, at 988-91; Sholley, supra note 5 at 559-60. See generally Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25
MINN. L. REV. 432 (1941); TRIBE, supra note 3 at § 6-3; THE FEDERALIST Nos. 41, 42
(James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
17 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 15-16 (1824); see also Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Stroud, 267 U.S. 404, 408 (1925); BERNARD C. GAvITr, THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 10 (1932).
18 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
191d. at 5.
20
See The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 573 (1847) (Taney, C.J.,
concurring).
21 See TRIBE, supra note 3, at 405.
22

1d.
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tions of the Commerce Clause continued until the mid-nineteenth
century. The Court generally tried to resolve such issues by attempting to determine whether a state enactment was a valid "police power" measure or an invalid regulation of commerce.2 3 These
attempts failed to bring consistency or coherence to the Court's
Commerce Clause decisions.
B. IntermediateApproaches
In 1851, in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,24 the Court attempted to

reconcile the two competing interpretations of the Commerce
Clause. The Court expressed the conviction that states could regulate commerce insofar as it was local in nature. Laws were only to
be held invalid when they had national economic impact, for only
then would uniformity of regulation be a necessity. The focus of the
Cooley doctrine was whether the commerce at issue was "national"
or "local" in character. For decades after Cooley, this "national"/"local" interpretive approach was utilized by the Court. 5
The Cooley classification of the subject of state regulation as "national" or "local" in character was confusing and resulted in decisions as conflicting as those generated under the "police
power"/"commerce" analysis which held sway after Gibbons.E6
State regulation was upheld if interstate commerce was "only indirectly, incidentally, and remotely" impacted. 7 If state or local laws
so impacted interstate commerce that the effect was deemed "substantial," it was invalidated by the Court as a "direct burden" on
such commerce.2 8
In the early 1940s the Court, led by Justice Stone and inspired by
the work of Professor Dowling, moved to a new analytical focus in
dormant Commerce Clause cases. With some modification, this approach survives today.2 9 From Gibbons to the present, the Supreme
23

Id. at 406.

53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
See, e.g., Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886); Ex Parte
McNiel, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236 (1871); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713
(1865).
26 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 408.
27 Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 482 (1888); see also Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v.
Railroad Comm'n, 283 U.S. 380 (1931); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S.
453 (1911); Erb v. Morasch, 177 U.S. 584 (1900).
28
See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917).
29 Dowling criticized the "direct/indirect burdens" test, suggesting a balancing test.
See Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1 (1940).
Chief Justice Stone first criticized the "burdens" test in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273
24

25
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Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has evolved as an
exaltation of judicial power over congressional prerogatives and
states' rights. This result is evident when one examines the intrusive standard of judicial review the Court now applies to state
enactments.
C. Modern Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
The modern Court utilizes two levels of judicial review in dormant Commerce Clause cases. The first level of inquiry is invoked
where "simple economic protectionism is affected by state legislation." 3 In such cases, the Court applies a rule of per se invalidity. 3 ' Thus, for example, where state law overtly blocks the flow of
interstate commerce at a state's borders, the Court will view it as a
protectionist measure which cannot withstand Commerce Clause
scrutiny. 32
Where a state law does not discriminate on its face between outof-state and in-state economic interests, a balancing test is applied
by the Court. The Court's most often cited articulation of this second level of review is found in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. :31
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
U.S. 34, 43 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting). Almost two decades later, Stone propounded
a new balancing approach which survives in a modified form today. See also Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and
State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 1091, 1094 (1986).
30 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
31 See id.; see also H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535-39 (1949);
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-06 (1948); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511, 522 (1935); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1925).
32 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621 (1978). But see Fort Gratiot
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S.Ct. 2019, 2022
(1992); Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S.Ct. 2009, 2011 (1992); Wyoming
v. Oklahoma, 112 S.Ct. 789, 801 (1992); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,
274 (1988). In the more recent cases the Court indicated that the "perse rule of invalidity" could be rebutted by a showing that "the discrimination is demonstrably justified
by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism." Fort Gratiot SanitaryLandfill,
112 S.Ct. at 2022. See also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
33 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Pike involved an action by a grower of high-quality cantaloupes against the official charged with enforcing an Arizona act requiring that all Arizona cantaloupe be packed in Arizona, thus prohibiting a California company from
shipping uncrated cantaloupes from its Arizona ranch to its California packing plant.
The Supreme Court invalidated the Arizona statute, holding that while the law did not
discriminate against those engaged in interstate commerce, and the state's interest in
enhancing the reputation of Arizona cantaloupes is legitimate, the state's interest clearly
was outweighed by the national interest in unencumbered trade. Id. at 143.
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are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will ... depend on the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities. 34
Under this formulation, even a statute which regulates "evenhandedly" and imposes only "incidental" burdens on interstate
commerce must be invalidated if the burden it imposes on commerce "is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits."

35

Pike's second-level test vests the Court with power to balance a
concededly legitimate state enactment unintentionally impacting interstate commerce with burdens that the law places on commerce.
At both the first and second levels of analysis, the Court actively
exercises a rigorous and intrusive review. It focuses on perceived
economic impacts on free trade, while arguably giving significantly
less weight to state concerns.
Attempts to justify the Court's view that the Commerce Clause
was intended to insure citizens' rights to free trade in interstate
commercial transactions and the corresponding intrusiveness of the
Court's dormant Commerce Clause review have proceeded on several fronts.

36

Rationalization of judicial exercise of delegated legislative power
under the Commerce Clause has included theories based on diminution of power,37 a free trade principle implicit in the Commerce
34 Id. at 142 (citation omitted). Professor Regan, observing that "citation of Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc. has become boilerplate in dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause opinions,"
nevertheless argues that the Court "has not been balancing." Regan, supra note 29, at
1092. Although the Court itself claims to "balance" and the commentators have
agreed, Regan argues that what the Court has been, and should be, doing is "preventing
states from engaging in purposeful economic protectionism." Id. at 1285. Regan's essay spans 196 pages of intense examination of modem dormant Commerce Clause cases
and commentary, ultimately observing that the Justices are not "intentionally misrepresenting their decision processes." Id. at 1284. Rather, Regan believes that "they are
imperfectly aware of what they are doing," and he suggests "that judges' intuitive grasp
of problems may outstrip their analytic understanding." Id. Regan's epic dissection of
contemporary dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and his conclusion that the
Court's intuition rather than its analysis has shaped its contours provides further evidence of the confusing complexity facing those who seek to penetrate beyond the
Court's stated justifications for the doctrine.
35
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
36 See supra note 3 and infra note 38 and accompanying text for a discussion of free
trade as a fundamental value of constitutional dimension.
37 This justification holds that when the states agreed to become part of a federal
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Clause,3" the implied intent of Congress,39 a principle of nondiscrimination,' and a pragmatic argument based on the premise that
union wherein Congress was delegated regulatory power over interstate commerce their
reserved general regulatory or police power and taxing power were diminished to the
extent that such regulation or taxation affects interstate commerce. See Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1851). See generally, Sedler, supra note
5, at 971-76.
38 This view points to the framers' concern about economic protectionism during the
era of governance under the Articles of Confederation and argues that the Commerce
Clause was intended to establish a national free trade market. Any state or local law
discriminating against or unduly burdening free trade among the states may be found by
the courts to violate the "free trade principle" of the Commerce Clause. See Dennis v.
Higgins, 111 S. Ct. 865 (1991). In Dennis, the Court declared that the dormant aspect
of the commerce clause implicitly recognizes a right of an individual or company to
"free trade." The Court held that this right to "free trade" is of constitutional dimension and that infringements upon that right may be vindicated against state encroachment by filing of a civil rights action pursuant to § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Id. at 869.
39 The failure of Congress to act affirmatively to authorize state regulation or taxation
is construed, under this theory, to indicate a positive intent of Congress to preempt such
state regulation or taxation. Courts and commentators find little merit in this theory.
See, e.g., Henry D. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 16 (1975); cf. Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further
Last Words on Erie--The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1687-88 (1974); see also
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 78 (1974).
More than half a century ago, Professor Powell explained the theory with more than
a tinge of sarcasm:
Now congress has a wonderful power that only judges and lawyers know
about. Congress has a power to keep silent. Congress can regulate interstate
commerce just by not doing anything about it. Of course when congress keeps
silent, it takes an expert to know what it means. But the judges are experts.
They say that congress by keeping silent sometimes means that it is speaking.
If congress keeps silent about interstate commerce that this not national in
character and that may be just as well regulated by the states, then congress is
silently silent, and the states may regulate. But if congress keeps silent about
the kind of commerce that is national in character and ought to be regulated
only by congress, then congress is silently vocal and says that commerce must
be free from state regulation.
Thomas R. Powell, The Still Small Voice of the Commerce Clause, in 3 SELECTED
ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 931, 932 (1938).
40 Advocates of this view argue that historically a principal purpose for delegating the
commerce power to Congress was to prevent discrimination and protectionism in interstate commercial transactions. Thus, state or local laws that discriminate against interstate commercial interests in favor of local in-state interests are unconstitutional. See
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). In
Barnwell Bros., Justice Stone observed that "when the regulation is of such a character
that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not
likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state." Id. at 184 n.2; see also
Tushnet, supra note 5, at 137-40; Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of
Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2029-31 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting),
wherein Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent questioned the majority's refusal to consider
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without judicial intervention, Congress would be unable to respond
effectively to state attempts at economic protectionism." Recent
commentators have suggested that none of these justifications which
purport to justify exercise of judicial power provides more than superficial support.42 Professor Martin Redish and Shane Nugent
have noted, for example, that "the recent literature expends relatively little effort attempting either to find the textual source or to
prove the legitimacy of the dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause."4 3 I
share Redish and Nugent's view that inadequate justification for the
that a Michigan statute's effect "seems likely to work to [that state's] economic
disadvantage."
41 This pragmatic concern about the need for judicial review of state and local laws
affecting commerce presents a plausible reason for judicial intervention. The Court has
asserted that "many subjects of potential federal regulation under [the commerce]
power inevitably escape congressional attention because of their local character and
diversity." Thus, the argument goes, enactment of state and local laws discriminating
against or burdening commerce would survive, ultimately causing economic chaos, because the institutional inertia of Congress would prevent a timely and effective federal
response. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978); Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362 (1943); Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941)
(Jackson, J. concurring); see also Tushnet, supra note 5, at 152-53; Maltz, supra note 5,
at 88. That many potential subjects of congressional power to regulate commerce are
numerous, diverse and local in character, seems to suggest to the Court that Congress
needs help, that the national legislature is very busy exercising other powers and cannot
be expected to keep track of myriad state and local legislation that impacts on interstate
commerce. Whether this concern provides adequate support for the judicial exercise of
a power granted to Congress is, as discussed below, more problematic.
42 Professor Sedler has summarized the defects in the Court's attempts to justify the
dormant Commerce Clause:
It has never related either the diminution of power justification nor the implied intention of Congress justification to the constitutional structure. It has
never explained why the affirmative grant of a non-exclusive power to Congress could diminish to any extent the exercise of the reserved general regulatory and taxation powers of the states. Nor has it explained how Congress
could exercise its legislative power by silence, when article I, section 7 specifically set forth the mode for the exercise of legislative power, requiring affirmative action by both houses of Congress and concurrence by the President. The
Court has simply asserted its role as the 'final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests' where (citing Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945)) state regulation or taxation affects interstate commerce and has sought standards by which to define the appropriate
scope of state power in these areas.
Sedler, supra note 5 at 891-92. For detailed discussions of justifications for the dormant
Commerce Clause, see id. at 968-99; Regan, supra note 28.
43 Redish & Nugent, supra note 5, at 571. Redish and Nugent conclude "that no
such legitimate constitutional source exists: the simple fact is that there is no dormant
[C]ommerce [C]lause to be found within the text or textual structure of the Constitution." Id. (citing Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S.
232, 260-63 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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Court's exercise of power under the dormant Commerce Clause has
been given by the courts and commentators.
The Court has conceded that potential subjects of federal regulation which have "escape[d] congressional attention . . . are [subjects] open to control by the States."" Curiously, the Court
purports to find limits on a state's right to exercise such control
"within the restraints imposed by the Commerce Clause itself."4 5
The Court candidly admits that "[t]he bounds of these restraints
4 6 Instead,
appear nowhere in the words of the Commerce Clause."
the Court finds them to "have emerged gradually in the dormant
Commerce Clause decisions of this Court.47
The following section suggests that the common law-like approach the Court has taken in its dormant Commerce Clause cases
is fundamentally inconsistent with Constitutional separation of
powers and federalism principles.
II
THE CONTRASTING MODEL: JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO
LEGISLATIVE JUDGMENT

A.

General Federal Common Law: Judicial Restraint and the
Erie Doctrine

For almost a century, federal courts exercised general common
law powers. From the Supreme Court's affirmation of such power
in Swift v. Tyson 48 in 1842, until its ultimate rejection in Erie Railroad v. Thompkins 4 9 in 1938, federal courts acted in diversity cases
to fill the interstices of state statutory law with an extensive body of
federal decisional law in the tradition of Anglo-American common
44 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623; see also Raymond Motor
Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978).
45 City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623. One might conclude that "a restraint imposed by the Commerce Clause itself" means that the literal words imposing such a
restraint would be discernable in the constitutional text. The text, however, speaks only
of congressional power to regulate commerce among the states.
46 Id.

47 Id.
48 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). In Swift, the Supreme Court placed its imprimatur on
the theory that in the absence of legislative direction, federal courts were empowered to
develop a body of decisional common law when resolving disputes.
49 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie rejected a long line of cases starting with Swift v. Tyson in
which the Court had decided diversity cases on the basis of general common law principles thus creating a body of federal decisional law instead of using choice of law rules to
select and apply state common law. See discussion infra at note 50.
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law jurisprudence. Erie put an abrupt halt to the exercise of this
power by federal courts.
The Court's eschewing of a power liberally exercised over the better part of a century was marked by the painful recognition that it
had long been acting in a manner that was antithetical to the fundamental structure of government established by the Constitution.
That the theory of Swift had been accepted and nurtured by some
of the Court's most respected members and had endured over such
a long period was not sufficient to sustain it. 5"
Erie recognized that when federal courts exercised general common law powers to resolve disputes among citizens of different
states, they were trammeling on state prerogatives guaranteed by
constitutional federalism. The Erie opinion declared that "[the
Supreme] Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in
our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several
States.""'
In words that could, per chance, accompany a similar rejection of
the dormant Commerce Clause, Justice Brandeis dismissed stare decisis concerns: "[T]he doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is, as Mr. Justice
Holmes said, 'an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the
courts of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable
array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct.' "52
50 Justice Brandeis' opinion for the Court in Erie recalled the remarks of Justice
Field, made many years earlier:
I admit that learned judges have fallen into the habit of repeating this doctrine
as a convenient mode of brushing aside the law of a State in conflict with their
views. And I confess that, moved and governed by the authority of the great
names of those judges, I have myself, in many instances, unhesitatingly and
confidently, but I think now erroneously, repeated the same doctrine. But
notwithstanding the great names which may be cited in favor of the doctrine,
and notwithstanding the frequency with which the doctrine has been reiterated, there stands, as a perpetual protest against its repetition, the Constitution of the United States, which recognizes and preserves the autonomy and
independence of the States-independence in their legislative and independence in their judicial departments.
Id. at 78-79 (quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893)).
51 Id. at 80. Justice Brandeis, quoting Justice Field, minced few words in cutting to
the heart of the matter:
Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is in
no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the State and, to that
extent, a denial of its independence.
Id. at 79 (quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 149 U.S. at 401).
52 Id. (citing Holmes' dissenting opinions in Kuhn v. Fairmont Cab Co., 215 U.S.
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After a century of experience, scholars began to note the rather
obvious parallel between the century long experiment with federal
common law and the development of dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.5 3 Surprisingly, most commentators who note the relationship between general common law adjudications and decisions
under the dormant Commerce Clause find little amiss with the
latter.5 4
Professor Monaghan, for example, has identified a constitutional
common law, typified by dormant Commerce Clause decisions.
These cases fall, argues Monaghan, within the embrace of a "specialized" federal common law which has survived the demise of the
more "general" federal common law interred by Erie." Erie recognized that federal courts continue to possess common law power
where specifically authorized by statute. Monaghan believes that
federal courts have exercised similar power by inferring authorization from the structure of the Constitution:
An acceptable accommodation of interstate, to say nothing of na349, 370-72 (1910) and Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-36 (1928)).
53 See Eule, supra note 5, at 435 n.50; Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and
JudicialIntervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 568 (1983); Monaghan, supra note 39, at 1417; see also TRIBE, supra note 3, at 403-04.

54 In 1957 Professor Ernest Brown argued that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine finds proper justification as constitutional common law. Said Brown:
[W]hen the limits that the federal system imposes upon its components are in
question, when the centrifugal, isolating or hostile forces of localism are manifested in state legislation, the interests of union require that these factors be
recognized and the judicial negative be interposed. It [is] hardly necessary to
add what some [justices] have not always recognized-the Court might more
readily intervene against state legislation under a [C]ommerce [C]lause challenge since it would at most make what it believed a proper allocation of
power, tentative and subject to reallocation by Congress ....
Ernest J. Brown, The Open Economy.- Justice Frankfurterand the Position of the Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219, 220-21 (1957); see also Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce
and State Power- Revised Version, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 551-52 (1947); Monaghan,

supra note 39, at 15-17. But see Redish & Nugent, supra note 42, at 601-03. Redish
and Nugent find the dormant Commerce Clause, as an exercise of constitutional common law, to be improper: "In our view, the dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause is in direct
opposition to the Constitution's structure for controlling state power, and thus undermines the constitutional balance of federalism." Id. at 603.
55 Monaghan observes that "one of the most salient illustrations of the Supreme
Court's derivation of federal rules of decision has gone insufficiently recognized-the
invalidation of state statutes because of inconsistency with the negative implication of
the grant to Congress of power '[t]o regulate Commerce... among the several States.' "
Monaghan, supra note 39, at 15. The notion of "general" federal common law was
rejected by the Erie Court leaving a limited federal court power to develop "specific"
federal common law in certain discrete circumstances. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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tional, interests in a given dispute dictates that the Supreme
Court must possess power to fashion substantive law not tied to
that of any state. Thus the authority to create federal common
law springs of necessity from the structure of the constitution,
from its basic division of authority between the national government and the states.56
Interestingly, Monaghan finds inherent weaknesses in the various
theories which purport to rationalize the dormant Commerce
Clause."7 While not attempting justification, Monaghan ultimately
concludes that "the most satisfactory explanation of the
[C]ommerce [C]lause cases is that the Supreme Court is fashioning
federal common law on the authority of the [C]ommerce
58
[C]lause.
Monaghan fails to see "why the Court is not making constitutionally inspired common law."' 59 The commentators who have noted
the common law aura which envelops dormant Commerce Clause
decision-making agree.'
The reason is simple: dormant Commerce Clause adjudication is common law decision-making. Congress is silent and in the common law tradition, the Court fashions
rules of decision which are subject to legislative modification or
displacement.
If Erie was rightly decided, and I believe it was, the exercise of
"specialized constitutional" common law powers emanating
from
56 Monaghan, supra note 39, at 14. Professor Monaghan urges that "[tihe Constitution is no less susceptible to interpretation through a consideration of its text, structure
and purposes than are statutes. There is accordingly no a priori reason to suppose that
it should differ from statutes in providing a basis for the generation of federal common
law." Id. at 13. In making this assertion, Monaghan emphasizes the "well known"
specialized federal common law arising from constitutional grants of federal court jurisdiction to decide admiralty disputes, id. at 13-14 n.73 (citing, e.g., Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 381-403 (1970); David P. Currie, Federalismand the
Admiralty. The Devil's Own Mess, 1960 S. Cr. REV. 158, 162-63); those involving
boundary disputes among the states, id. at 14 n.74 (citing, e.g., Vermont v. New York,
417 U.S. 270, 277 (1974); Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512,
1520 (1969)); and those involving foreign relations, id. at n.75 (citing, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-27 (1964)).
57 Monaghan, supra note 39, at 15. For example, Monaghan rejects the theory that
the Court is interpreting congressional "silence" rather than the Constitution in dormant Commerce Clause cases. Monaghan suggests that "legislation by silence" cannot
be squared with the constitutionally explicit prescription of the format for enacting legislation, with attendant checks and balances. Id. at 16.
58 Id. at 17. ("That clause embodies a national, free-trade philosophy which can be
read as requiring the Court, in limited circumstances, to displace state-created trade
barriers.").
59 Id.
60 See generally supra notes 55-56.
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the Commerce Clause should be discarded for precisely the same
reason that general federal common law powers were cast aside. In
the absence of specific constitutional authorization or delegation,
use of the dormant Commerce Clause to overturn state legislative
action similarly seems "an unconstitutional assumption of powers
by courts of the United States." 6 Erie's concerns about constitutional federalism are equally applicable to the dormant Commerce
Clause.
B.

Protection Afforded State Sovereignty by the Tenth
Amendment and CongressionalPower Under the
Commerce Clause

One need not depart from the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence to observe the extent to which the dormant Commerce
Clause rests on an unstable theoretical base. Indeed, both the
Court's liberal and conservative members adhere to a fundamental
view of federalism in cases involving affirmative exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause that seems significantly at
odds with the views they express when the Court purports to act
pursuant to the clause's negative inferences.
Notwithstanding their philosophical orientation, liberal and conservative Justices, in expounding upon the scope of congressional as
opposed to judicial power under the Commerce Clause, have staked
out positions which seriously undermine the conceptual integrity of
dormant Commerce Clause theory. In short, the Court's view of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause cannot easily be
squared with its own exercise of judicial power which is said to flow
from the identical textual source.
Two cases decided within nine years of each other, National
League of Cities v. Usery 62 and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
TransitAuthority,63 provide an interesting vehicle for analyzing the
powers wielded by the Court and Congress under both the affirmative and negative components of the Commerce Clause. The various opinions supporting the two competing perspectives were
marked, at some points, by strident accusations of lack of fealty to
principles of representative democracy and federalism.'
Erie R.R. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
62 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
63 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
64 Justice Brennan's dissent in National League of Cities observed that the majority
sought to "repudiate principles governing judicial interpretation of our Constitution
settled since the time of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall" and manufactured an abstraction
61
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The first case, National League of Cities, was hailed as a
landmark decision when decided in 1976. For the first time, the
Court identified an express constitutional limitation on congressional power to regulate commerce. The Tenth Amendment,6 5 said
the Court, places limits on congressional power to regulate "states
qua states."'66 Thus, the Court invalidated amendments to the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act 67 which purported to command local
and state governments to adhere to federal wage and hour guidelines when dealing with government workers:
[T]he dispositive factor is that Congress has attempted to exercise its Commerce Clause authority to prescribe minimum wages
and maximum hours to be paid by the States in their capacities
as sovereign governments. In so doing, Congress has sought to
wield its power in a fashion that would impair
6 8 the States' "ability
to function effectively in a federal system."

National League of Cities reliance on the Tenth Amendment to
protect integral state functions proved difficult in application, at
least in the view of the five person Garcia majority which overruled
without substance "founded neiiher in the words of the Constitution nor on precedent."
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 857, 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan
could not "recall another instance in the Court's history when the reasoning of so many
decisions covering so long a span of time has been discarded in such a roughshod manner." Id. at 871-72. He felt the majority had struck "a catastrophic judicial body blow
at Congress' power." Id. at 880.
Justice Powell's dissent in Garcia was equally strong:
[T]his decision substantially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution .... [A]n unelected majority of five Justices-today rejects almost 200
years of the understanding of the constitutional status of federalism .... The
Court's action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright rejection,
of the history of our country and the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557, 560, 577 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Justice O'Connor also dissented in Garcia: "[T]here is now a real risk that Congress
will gradually erase the diffusion of power between State and Nation on which the
Framers based their faith in the efficiency and vitality of our Republic .... The Court
today . . . washes its hands of all efforts to protect the States." Id. at 584, 587
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
65 U.S. CONsT. amend. X. provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution nor prohibited to it by the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
66
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 847.
67 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-205 (1992).
68 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S.
542, 547 n.7 (1979)). Said the Court: "[I]nsofar as the challenged amendments operate
to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by
[the Commerce Clause]." Id.
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the case nine years later.69
Considering the strongly held views on both sides of the debate,
the intra-court conflict regarding the existence and scope of constitutional limitations on congressional power under the Commerce
Clause will doubtless continue for sometime.7" Notwithstanding
the merits or the eventual outcome of that debate, the positions of
members of the Court on both sides of the Congressional power
issue converge in a way that seriously erodes the rationale for exercise of judicial power under the dormant Commerce Clause.
Particularly intriguing is the fact that, with one exception, 7 ' none
of the Justices who expressed their views in NationalLeague of Cities and Garcia seems to have looked beyond the issue before them
to the implications of their arguments on corollary dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
Interestingly, there were significant points of agreement between
the opposing camps. Both sides eschewed judicial usurpation of
power as inconsistent with democratic principles, although each accused the other of engaging therein.7 2 There was also agreement in
principle with the view that the states were intended by the framers
to play a significant role in our federal judicial system, although
once again, each side accused the other of undermining that system.73 While the scope of Tenth Amendment protection of state
69 For the Garcia majority, Justice Blackman rejected "as unsound in principle and
unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a
judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional.'" Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985).
70 Both National League of Cities and Garcia were decided by a bare five person
majority. Justice Rehnquist's short and restrained dissent in the latter case suggests
that the principle of stare decisis may have little application to this doctrinal conflict.
Said Rehnquist confidently: "I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to
spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again
command the support of a majority of this Court." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). There is already evidence that Rehnquist's prediction may be accurate.
See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcraft, 111 S. Ct.
2395 (1991).
71 In his dissent in National League of Cities, Justice Brennan questioned whether the
majority was "signaling abandonment of the heretofore unchallenged principle that
Congress 'can, if it chooses, entirely displace the States to the full extent of the farreaching Commerce Clause.'" 426 U.S. at 877 (quoting Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New
York State Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 780 (1947)) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan noted that
this principle had been applied in the Court's dormant Commerce Clause cases as well.
Id. at 875.
72 Compare NationalLeague ofCities, 426 U.S. at 867-68, 869, 875-76 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) with Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546, 560 (Powell, J., dissenting).
73 Compare NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845, 849 with Garcia, 469 U.S. at
549, 556.
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sovereignty was hotly contested, it is clear that both sides would
agree the Amendment interdicts federal attempts to exercise powers
which the Constitution has not delegated to the United States. 74 Finally, there seemed to be basic agreement that the Commerce
Clause granted plenary or exclusive power to Congress to regulate
interstate commerce.7 5
A number of questions arise when applying these apparently undisputed principles to dormant Commerce Clause theory:
(1)If, as is obvious from constitutional text, Congress was delegated plenary legislative power to regulate commerce, how is it that
the Court may exercise such power by judicial decision?
(2) If the Tenth Amendment bars Congress from "invad[ing]
state sovereignty by exercising powers not delegated to it by the
Constitution, ' ' 76 can federal courts nonetheless invade state sovereignty, striking down state legislation though the commerce power
was not delegated to federal courts?
(3) If state sovereignty is such an important component of federalism, why do appointed federal judges, purporting to act pursuant
74 While opposing a broad reading of the Tenth Amendment, Justice Brennan agreed
that "Congress may not invade state sovereignty by exercising powers not delegated to
it by the Constitution." National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 863 n.4 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Brennan cited United States v. Darby, wherein the Court had observed that
the purpose underlying the Tenth Amendment was "to allay fears that the new national
government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be
able to exercise fully their reserved powers." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124
(1941).
Other Justices have read the Tenth Amendment as providing more protection of state
interests. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842-843; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549
(majority opinion), 568-70 (Powell, J., dissenting). One would suppose that to be consistent, in the similar context of the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court would treat
the Tenth Amendment as a substantial obstacle to federal judicial exercise of delegated
legislative power. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
75 Compare National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 836, 840 with 426 U.S. at 857
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
76 Id., 426 U.S. at 861-62 n.4 (Brennan, J. dissenting); see also Fry v. United States,
421 U.S. 542 (1975); Darby, 312 U.S. at 124. In Darby, the Court cited Justice Joseph
Story's constitutional commentary:
It is plain, therefore, that it could not have been the intention of the framers of
... [the Tenth Amendment] to give it effect, as an abridgement of any of the
powers granted under the constitution .... Its sole design is to exclude any
interpretation,by which other powers should be assumed beyond those which are
granted.
312 U.S. at 124; JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 1908 (2d ed. 1851) (emphasis added). If barring assumption of
power in the absence of a specific constitutional grant was the design of the Tenth
Amendment, how can the courts assume a power to regulate commerce granted only to
Congress?
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to a power delegated to Congress, void state laws when Congress
itself has taken no action against the enacting state?
Other points made by the various majority and dissenting opinions in National League of Cities and Garcia further undercut the
doctrinal foundation of the dormant Commerce Clause." In limiting the reach of congressional power, the NationalLeague of Cities
majority also cast doubt on its own power to invade areas of traditional state concern.78
In another interesting aspect of National League of Cities and
Garcia, Justices Brennan and Blackmun emphasized that a state's
position vis a vis the national government is a fundamental and essential component of our federalism. 79 Notwithstanding this observation, both Justices argued that when Congress attempts to usurp
77National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851. Chief Justice Rehnquist identified
traditional police power activities such as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation,
public health, and parks and recreation as "typical of those performed by state and local
governments in discharging their dual functions of administering the public law and
furnishing public services." Id. In this instance, the National League of Cities majority
was attempting to limit Congress' ability under the Commerce Clause to intrude in
areas of traditional state functions; its goal was to protect a residuum of state power in
the federal system. Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that these were but examples of
"numerous line and support activities which are well within the area of traditional operations of state and local governments." Id. at 851 n.16.
78 Id. at 875 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent stressed that the
power of state legislatures and local governments to enact and administer laws is a core
state concern:
Certainly the paradigm of sovereign action-action qua State-is in the enactment and enforcement of state laws ....
[T]he ouster of state laws obviously
curtails or prohibits the States' prerogatives to make policy choices respecting
subjects clearly of greater significance to the "State qua State" than the minimum wage paid to state employees.
Id. at 875 (citations omitted). If traditional state functions lie at the heart of the state
sovereignty National League of Cities sought to protect from congressional overreaching, one must wonder why those Justices, who in that case expressed great concern
regarding federal intervention into the relatively obscure state function of setting wages
of city employees, were not similarly reluctant to intervene and strike at one of the most
vital organs of state government, the legislature.
79 In his dissent in National League of Cities, Justice Brennan complained about the
startling role the majority created for the federal judiciary:
Judicial restraint in this area merely recognizes that the political branches of
our Government are structured to protect the interests of the States, as well as
the Nation as a whole, and that the States are fully able to protect their own
interests in the premises. Congress is constituted of representatives of both the
Senate and House elected from the States. Decisions upon the extent of federal
intervention under the Commerce Clause into the affairs of the States are in
that sense decisions of the States themselves. Judicial redistribution of powers
granted the National Government by the terms of the Constitution violates
the fundamental tenet of our federalism that the extent of federal intervention
into the State's affairs in the exercise of delegated powers shall be determined
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prerogatives which are vital incidents of state sovereignty, the remedy is political not judicial." It is the structure of the federal government itself, observed Blackmun in Garcia, that was a "principal
means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the
federal system."'" Blackmun noted the important role played by
the states in the selection of the legislative and executive branches of
the national government. 82 Thus, Garcia rested, in substantial part,
on the belief that "State sovereign interests ...

are more properly

protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the
federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal
power."8 3
by the States' exercise of political power through their representatives in
Congress.
Id. at 876-77 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
80 For the Garcia majority, Justice Blackmun emphasized:
[W]e continue to recognize that the States occupy a special and specific position in our constitutional system and that the scope of Congress' authority
under the Commerce Clause must reflect that position. But the principal and
basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional
action-the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal governmental action. The political process ensures that laws
that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
Sl Id. at 550.
82 The states indirectly influence the composition of the membership of the House of
Representatives, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, and the occupant of the presidency by
controlling electoral qualifications and through the Electoral College, see U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 1. More direct control was granted the states with regard to the Senate, where

each state has equal representation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
In support for the proposition that state sovereignty was intended by the framers to
be protected by the constitutional structure of federal governance, Justice Blackmun
pointed to the views of Madison and James Wilson. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS.
43, at 315, 46, at 332, 62 at 408 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961); 2
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-

CONSTITUTION 438-39 (James Wilson) (Jonathan Elliot 2d ed., 1876) (remarks of
James Wilson at Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
Justice Blackmun remarked that "it is no novelty" to identify the structure of the
federal government as, by design, protecting the states from congressional overreaching.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-51 (citing JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175-184 (1980); D. Bruce La Pierre, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of
the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779 (1982); Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards
of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and the Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954)).
83 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552. Justice Blackmun emphasized that the effectiveness of the
federal political process in protecting state's rights is obvious, for example, when one
ERAL

considers the extent to which federal tax revenues have been directed to state treasuries.
Indeed, Blackmun noted fully one-fifth of state and local government funding comes
from federal grants. He also emphasized the success of states in persuading Congress to
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It is revealing to juxtapose the Garcia majority's view with the
position taken by adherents to the National League of Cities perspective."4 For example, Justice Powell dismissed the view that
Congress could be expected to restrain itself from usurping important constituents of state sovereignty. Powell pointed to "a variety
of structural and political changes occurring in this century [which]
have combined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state
and local values." 5 Thus, he believed that entrusting the sovereignty of the states to members of Congress is a dubious proposition
given the overwhelming complexity and sheer mass of legislative
action at the national level.8 6
While the two factions of the Court squared off over whether
Congress can and should be the sole protector of state sovereignty,
the conflicting views of the Justices on this point converge in a way
that undercuts dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Thus, the National League of Cities side argues that Congress has grown insensitive to state and local concerns and that the complexity of modern
lawmaking at the national level is so overwhelming that members of
Congress do not understand much of what they are voting onstrongly contradicting the argument that the national legislature
will reverse any dormant Commerce Clause decision of the courts
which unacceptably intrudes on important state or local interests.7
exempt them from a broad range of requirements imposed pursuant to the commerce
power. Id. at 552-53.
84
See, e.g., id. at 555-56 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 584 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
85

Id. at 565 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTER-

(ACIR), REGULATORY FEDERALISM: POLICY, PROCESS,
IMPACT AND REFORM 50 (1984)). Justice Powell found the erosion of state influence in
the national government had resulted from a number of factors including direct election
of senators, weakened local political parties, and the ascendancy of the national media.
These, among other causes, he found to have "made Congress increasingly less representative of state and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to the demands of
various national constituencies." Id. (citing ACIR, Federalism in the Courts.-Agenda
for the 1980's, in ACIR, THE FUTURE OF FEDERALISM IN THE 1980's 97 (1981); Lewis
B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 847, 849 (1979)).
86 Powell concluded that not even the most diligent legislators really understand, in a
meaningful way, the legislative proposals before them:
Federal legislation is drafted primarily by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and the complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for even
the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar with many of the statutes enacted.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 576 (Powell, J., dissenting).
87 Unlike other constitutional provisions giving rise to judicial declarations of unconGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
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If, in NationalLeague of Cities, all of the states, counties, and towns
across the nation could not persuade Congress to exempt their employees from minimum federal wage requirements, how could one
city or one state possibly exert enough pressure to trigger a legislative reversal of an erroneous federal court decision under the dormant Commerce Clause?
Garcia'smajority view also supports criticism of dormant Commerce Clause theory in that it prefers a political over a judicial remedy when regulation of commerce is at issue. It follows from this
position that a silent Congress, imbued with explicit power to regulate commerce, should not be supplanted by an activist judiciary
which aggressively strikes down state and local laws. 88 From the
face of constitutional text, it appears that it is Congress alone and
not the judiciary that is delegated the power to deal with problems
relating to the flow of commerce among the states.
The text of the Constitution provides explicit support for Garcia's political, to the exclusion of the judicial, remedy where allegations are made that state law unduly burdens interstate commerce.
In sum, the various, often conflicting, positions taken by members of the Court in National League of Cities and Garcia are appropriate counterweights in the philosophical debate about the
scope of congressional power under the affirmative Commerce
Clause. However, those positions, when applied to dormant Commerce Clause theory, seriously weaken its doctrinal rationale.
stitutionality, judicial decisions grounded upon the dormant Commerce Clause are always subject to congressional modification or reversal. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,
328 U.S. 408 (1946); see Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and JudicialIntervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 570 (1983) ("If, compared with Congress' wishes, the federal
courts prove overzealous in protecting free trade, insufficiently deferential to state interests and determinations, or simply inadequate in exploring and interpreting facts, then
Congress can step in and use its commerce power to override the courts."); see also
TRIBE, supra note 3, at 403-04; Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of NationalPower Vis-d- Vis
the States: The Dispensability of JudicialReview, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1585, 1587 n.194
(1977); Dowling, supra note 29, at 20, 23; Monaghan, supra note 39, at 15-17. If a
modem Congress is unable or unwilling to act decisively to protect legitimate interests
of state and local governments from federal encroachment, the National League of Cities theory, then the belief that Congress will reverse dormant Commerce Clause decisions invalidating the law of only one state or one town seems an improbable
conclusion, at best.
88 If, as the Garcia view would have it, the political process provides the sole remedy
under our constitutional structure to protect state sovereignty from abuses of the affirmative commerce power, it seems only logical that the political process should similarly
be the appropriate remedy to redress grievances of those who deem their "right" to freetrade unduly burdened by local or state legislation.
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C. Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection
Comparing judicial review under substantive due process and
equal protection theories with review under the dormant Commerce
Clause provides additional fuel for criticism of the latter. When
deciding disputes involving either of the former theories, the modem Court displays considerable deference to legislative judgments.
In contrast, judicial review under the dormant Commerce Clause is
strict, nondeferential and intrusive.
The history of substantive due process and equal protection analysis is marked by the waxing and waning of judicial activism.89
From the close of the nineteenth century until the mid-1930s, judicial analysis of laws under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses "provided the Court with the most useful and flexible concepts to promote and protect the economic scheme that the justices
believed was best for the country." 90 In "Lochnerizing,"' the
89 In their treatise on constitutional law, Professors Rotunda, Nowak, and Young
encapsulize this phenomena:
We have come full circle with the concepts of substantive due process and
equal protection in the area of general economic or social welfare legislation.
Originally there was little active review of such legislation, because the judges
realized that the federal courts should defer to the other branches of government unless laws were totally arbitrary deprivations of liberty. Slowly there
emerged independent judicial control of all governmental policies under the
guise of enforcing the due process guarantee. Today, the justices have accepted the position that they are only to actively guard fundamental constitutional values and that they should allow other branches of government great
latitude in dealing with issues of "economics and social welfare" which do not
touch upon these values.
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE, § 15.4, at 60 (1986).
90
1d. § 15.4, at 52.
91 "Lochnerizing" is a popular label for the free-wheeling judicial activism of the
early twentieth century. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (a case generally
viewed as signaling the opening of the era of intrusive judicial review of legislative judgments). Lochner, however, was not the first case utilizing intense and skeptical judicial
review of legislative motives. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). In
fact, the philosophical seeds which bore fruit in Allgeyer, Lochner, and their progeny
were sown at least as early as the 1870s, if not before. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (Field, J., dissenting), 114-16 (Bradley, J., dissenting)
(1873). See also Edwin S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil
War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366 (1911); Howard J. Graham, Procedure to SubstanceExtra-JudicialRise of Due Process 1830-60, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 483 (1952); THOMAS M.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868); 6 CHARLES
FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88 PART ONE, 1320-74 (1971).

Professor Tribe cautions that " 'Lochnerizing' has become so much an epithet that
the very use of the label may obscure attempts at understanding." TRIBE, supra note 3,
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Court closely scrutinized laws using a strict ends-means test. 9 2
In cases where claims were made that a law ran afoul of the
Court's concept of economic substantive due process rights of business and industry, the focus of judicial scrutiny was the examination
of legislative ends and means. This rigorous test required proponents of a statute to show a "real and substantial" relationship be93
tween a law and its goals.
Justice Holmes, an outspoken critic of Lochner and the intrusive
substantive due process analysis it now represents, explained his
view in a dissent joined by Justice Brandeis:
I think the proper course is to recognize that a state legislature
can do what ever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some
express prohibition in the Constitution of the Unites States or of
the State, and that Courts should be careful not to extend such
prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them
conceptions of public
policy that the particular Court may hap94
pen to entertain.

Laurence Tribe has reduced, to its essence, the basic rationalization of judicial intervention in substantive due process cases and
found therein the seeds of its ultimate rejection:
[T]hat the courts were restoring the natural order which had
been upset by the legislature-was increasingly perceived as fundamentally flawed. There was no "natural" economic order to
upset or restore, and legislative or judicial decision in any direction could neither be restrained nor justified on any such basis.
The legitimacy of the Court's way of identifying implied limits
95
on legislative authority was thus subject to increasing question.
at 567. Tribe makes several points in this regard. Notwithstanding the use of a strict
standard of judicial review, many more statutes survived due process attack than succumbed to it. The Court's invalidations of state and federal laws during the Lochner
era were based not only on substantive due process grounds but on other provisions of
the national charter, including the Contract, Commerce, and the Equal Protection
Clauses. In the final analysis, Professor Tribe emphasizes, the Court was not adhering
to a perspective on the lunatic fringe of political and economic philosophy of the time,
but rather its "views echoed a powerful strand in the thought and politics of the early
twentieth century." Id. at 568.
92 See generally id. at 568-70.
93See, e.g., Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111 (1928); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 56, 64 (1905).
94
Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445-46 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
95 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 579 (citing Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46
HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933); K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934); THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT
(1935); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930)). Tribe also notes the
similarity of approach attendant substantive due process analysis and the "general federal common law" thesis flowing from Swift v. Tyson:
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In the mid-1930s, the doctrinal basis of substantive due process
analysis began to unravel under the pressures of the demands of
modem government and the tumult wrought by severe economic
crisis during the "Great Depression." '96
Legislation proposed by the Roosevelt administration in response
to economic and social turmoil was enacted by the "New Deal"
Congress. These laws were enacted, in part, pursuant to Congress'
regulatory power under the Commerce Clause. They generally
called for extensive federal regulation of matters previously considered to be within the purview of the states; several were invalidated
in the midst of Roosevelt's first term by Supreme Court decisions
which took a restrictive view of the scope of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause. 97 Such judicial activism together
with strict economic substantive due process and equal protection
review of legislative action ultimately generated a storm of controversy and threats by President Roosevelt to "pack" the Court with
new justices.9 8
The Court promptly reversed its course and moved rapidly from
Just as the Swift v. Tyson doctrine that federal judges should apply the "general common law" in diversity cases could not survive the belief that there just
was no transcendent body of binding general common law, so too that belief
ultimately devastated Lochner's due process doctrine that legislatures may not
upset the "natural" conditions of contract and property enshrined in common
law categories ....
Id.

96

See generally id. at 578-81.

97 ROTUNDA et al., supra note 89, § 15.4, at 52-53; see also ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY,
THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 165-66 (1960).

98 Court "packing" was a colloquial expression of the time which referred to the plan
of the President to legislatively expand the number of justices from nine to fifteen. The
plan was that Roosevelt would name new Justices whom would hopefully agree with his
expansive view of the scope of congressional power. At the same time, the new members of the Court would most likely constitute a majority of the larger court and would
vote to reverse earlier decisions which nullified administration-backed legislation passed
to confront the depressed economy. The Court packing scheme did not receive broad
support and was rendered unnecessary by subsequent developments. Several justices
resigned or died, one switched his vote, and the Court began to take an expansive view
of congressional power under the Commerce Clause which survives today. For various
perspectives on the Court packing controversy, see Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court
and the PoliticalBranches: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 810,
851-52 (1974); Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 314-15
(1955); William E. Leuchtenberg, The Origins ofFranklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan, 1966 S. CT. REV. 347; Alpheus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone and FDR's
Court Plan, 61 YALE L.J. 791 (1952). See also JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE,
THE 168 DAYS (1938); BAKER, BACK TO BACK-THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE
SUPREME COURT (1967); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY (1941).
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the extreme of strict judicial review of legislative judgments to the
opposite pole of, as one commentator called it, "judicial
abdication." 99
In United States v. Carolene Products Co. ,00 for example, the
Court rejected a substantive due process challenge to a federal statute, signalling that the intensive judicial review synonymous with
the Lochner era no longer possessed vitality. Justice Stone, writing
for the Court, dramatically narrowed the scope of judicial review of
legislative action: "[S]uch inquiries, where the legislative judgment
is drawn in question, must be restricted to the issue of whether any
slate of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed
' '°
affords support for it."
As time passed, the rejection of strict
end-means judicial review by the Court moved to the point of virtual non-reviewability. 1°2 For example, in Ferguson v. Skrupa,1°3
decided almost two decades after the demise of Lochnerian analysis,
the Court summarized lessons it learned from past incursions into
the legislative domain:
The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner . . .and like cases-that
due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when
they believe the legislature has acted unwisely-has long since
been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional
proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies .... 1o4
99 TRIBE, supra note 3, at 581-86. "[T]he Court declared that it would sustain regulation in the socio-economic sphere if any state of facts either known or reasonably
inferrable afforded support for the legislative judgment. Even this limited scrutiny soon
gave way to virtually complete judicial abdication." Id. at 582.
100 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
101 Id. at 154. While Justice Stone was denigrating judicial activism regarding substantive due process, he was apparently oblivious to the same genre of judicial overreaching found in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In fact, Justice Stone may
be seen as the father of the modem dormant Commerce Clause balancing test which
seems akin to the close judicial scrutiny rejected in Carolene Products. Id. at 152.
102 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
103 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
104 Id. at 730. The Ferguson Court also observed:

[T]he District Court in the present case.., adopted the philosophy ... that it
is the province of courts to draw on their own views as to the morality, legitimacy and usefulness of a particular business in order to decide whether a statute bears too heavily upon that business and by so doing violates due process.
Under the system of government created by our Constitution it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation. There was
a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike down
laws which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with
some particular economic or social philosophy.
Id. at 728-29; see also Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. at 488; Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
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Similarly, with regard to judicial review based on the Equal Protection Clause,' °5 the modem Court has shown great deference to
legislative judgments. 0 6 However, from the late nineteenth century
until the mid- 1930s, the Justices used equal protection and due process analyses to strike down social welfare and economic legislation
which ran counter to their laissez-faire views of the proper role of
government.'0 7 Thus, in reviewing claims that laws violated equal
protection guarantees, "[t]he justices did not defer to legislative decisions but instead independently determined what ends the government might pursue in conformity with their view of the role of the
government in a free economy."' 0 8
As with economic substantive due process review, when the
Court renounced intrusive equal protection analysis, it quickly
moved across the analytical spectrum to a position of extreme deference to legislative judgments. The Court refused to intervene except in the rare case when a challenger could show a law was totally
0 9 In language alarbitrary, lacking any rational basis whatsoever.'
most indistinguishable from that denouncing substantive review
under the Due Process Clause, the Court again emphasized its modern view of the appropriate role of the judiciary:
When local economic regulation is challenged solely as violating the Equal Protection Clause, this Court consistently defers to
legislative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory discriminations ....

States are accorded wide latitude in

the regulation of their local economies under their police powers .... In short, the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature

to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor

Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins., 336 U.S. 220 (1949);
Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S.
236 (1941); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
105 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides, in pertinent part: "No State shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
106 Such deference is, however, displaced where a law is subjected to an equal protection challenge in the context of invidious discrimination, a suspect classification, or infringement of a fundamental right. See generally TRIBE, supra note 3, § 16-6, at 145154.
07
1 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT
1860-1915 (1945); CLYDE E. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS 64-97 (1954);
Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 470-81 (1909).
108 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 89, § 18.3 at 323.
109 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955); Railway
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949); Daniel v. Family Sec. Life
Ins., 336 U.S. 220, 224-25 (1949); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330
U.S. 552, 563-64 (1947).
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proceed along suspect lines; in the economic sphere, it is only
invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot
stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment. 0
One is compelled to inquire why it is any more appropriate under
the dormant Commerce Clause, than under the Due Process or
Equal Protection Clauses to strictly scrutinize legislative judgments
and to strike down those which the Court deems inconsistent with
implied Constitutional free-trade principles. In contrast, the evolution of judicial review of substantive due process and equal protection claims culminating in the rejection of activist judicial oversight
of economic and social welfare legislation vindicates the values of
majoritarian rule as intended by the framers.
Justice Black's evaluation of the Court's dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence found in it the same brand of judicial
chutzpah that fueled its Lochnerian substantive due process doctrine. Labelling the Court a "superlegislature" when it applies intrusive dormant Commerce Clause review, Black cautioned:
A century and a half of constitutional history and government
admonishes this Court to leave [the] choice to the elected legislative representatives of the people themselves, where it properly
belongs both on democratic principles and requirements of efficient government' 1 1 . ... If there is a conflict in ... local regulations... there is a simple remedy.... That remedy does not rest
in a denial to the state ... of its power to protect life and property within its borders, but it does lie in the exercise of para2
mount authority of Congress.'
11o City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976) (per curiam) (citations

omitted). While I argue herein that the Court's approach to equal protection analysis is
demonstrably inconsistent with its dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the Court, in a
footnote in City of New Orleans, makes the seemingly off-hand remark that the deferential approach to judicial review it uses in equal protection cases is not apposite to other
constitutional provisions such as the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause. Id.
at 304 n.5. Without explanation, the per curiam opinion cryptically remarks that
"[v]ery different principles govern even economic regulation when constitutional provisions such as the Commerce Clause are implicated." Id. The Court may be alluding to
the affirmative exercise of power by Congress under the Commerce Clause. However,
to the extent that this remark was intended to apply to the supposed negative inferences
of that clause, those "very different principles" deserve reexamination and an explanation as to why intrusive judicial review of legislation is more appropriate under the
dormant Commerce Clause than the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
III Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 789 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting).
112d at 791 (quoting Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280, 292
(1914)). Southern Pacific involved a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to an Arizona law that, for reputed safety reasons, limited the length of trains traversing the
state's rail system. Justice Black found particularly provocative the fact that Congress
had been approached by rail industry opponents of such measures. Congressional hearings had been held on proposed federal legislation which would have preempted such
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Justice Black's dissent is particularly compelling where it questions
how the Court could possibly balance a multitude of competing interests as a legislature does. 1 3 The answer is quite clear; the Court
is just that, a court. It is ill-equipped to wield legislative power.
The Court's experience with issues concerning federal common law,
substantive due process, equal protection, and the scope of congressional power under the affirmative side of the Commerce Clause
affirms the propriety of judicial restraint. History teaches that
when the judiciary injects its own view of appropriate legislative
action, it cuts severely across the grain of constitutional democracy's structural protection. At stake are fundamental elements of
constitutional structure: separation of powers and the relationship
of national to state and local interests in the federal system.
Section III discusses how the dormant Commerce Clause impacts
on separation of powers and federalism principles in the context of a
particularly thorny environmental regulatory problem and suggests
lessons to be learned from that example.
III
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS AT WORK:
THE RIGHT TO TRAFFIC IN TRASH AS AN
ELEMENT OF FREE-TRADE
WORTHY OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION

Part of the title of this Article, "Trashing the Constitution," is
concededly a somewhat less than clever double entendre. It is,
however unartful, intended to make two points using contemporary
conflict over mountains of trash moving in interstate commerce: (1)
the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is inconsistent with fundamental precepts of constitutional federalism; and (2)
the impact on accepted principles of federalism and separation of
powers by the Court is evident where strict dormant Commerce
Clause analysis has been used to favor free-trade over legitimate,
non-protectionist, state concerns.
state laws, but Congress failed to pass the proposed bill. Id. at 786. It was only after
Congress had refused to exercise its power to regulate commerce that opponents of
nonuniform state train length laws sought relief in the courts. Id. at 786-87. In the
end, it was the Court, and not Congress, that regulated commerce; a result Justice Black
found to be little short of incredible. See id. at 784.
1131d. at 789-90.

OREGON LAW REVIEW

A.

[Vol. 71, 1992]

Scope of the "Out-of-State" Trash Problem

In ever-increasing quantities,' 14 garbage1 15 is being disposed of at
landfills across the country, notwithstanding efforts by state legislatures to reduce its volume." 6 Both Congress" t7 and state legislatures1 18 seek an end to reliance on landfills as the primary option for
dealing with growing mountains of solid waste. The Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), as well as enactments of state and local governments, seek to reduce environmental
harm often attending landfill disposal.1 19
States, local communities, and rural residents face an acute prob114 In his dissent in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992), Chief Justice Rehnquist cited a 1990 United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) study which indicates that the volume of solid
waste produced in the United States is expected "to continue rising for the foreseeable
future." Id. at 2028. The Chief Justice noted the following:
[M]unicipal solid wastes have increased from 128.1 million tons in 1975 to
179.6 million tons in 1988, expected to rise to 216 million tons by the year
2000 ... 1988 waste was the equivalent of 4.0 pounds per person per day,
expected to rise to 4.4 pounds per person by the year 2000.
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
115 "Garbage" or "trash" is what most people call it. Lawyers, bureaucrats and those
who collect, transport, and dump it use the more clinical term "solid waste." "Solid
waste" is a legal term of art; it includes domestic household waste and garbage historically disposed in open dumps and private and municipal landfills. The federal law that
deals with solid waste is the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6987 (1988) (RCRA), which defines "solid waste" as follows:
[A]ny garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply
treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material,
including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from
industrial, commercial, mining and agricultural operations, and from community activities, but does not include solid or dissolved material domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows or industrial
discharge which are point sources subject to permits under section 1342 of
title 33, or source, special nuclear, or byproduct material as defined by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Id. § 6903(27).
116 For example, state legislatures have instituted state solid waste disposal planning
processes that put in place statutory mechanisms which encourage or mandate (1) recovery of reusable goods from solid wastes previously placed in landfills and (2) recycling of such recovered wastes. See, e.g., CA. PUB. RES. CODE § 40052 (West 1992);
MD. ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 9-1702(d) (2) (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:lE-2(b) (West
1991); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0103 (McKinney 1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 268.317 (1988); W. VA.CODE § 20-5f-5d (1991). In the RCRA,Congress indicated a
desire to assist states in recovery and recycling. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4).
7
11 See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987.
1'SSeesupra note 115.
119 Important state and local concerns about landfills include the increased risk of
disease and toxic contamination affecting public health and safety. Other concerns include damage to rural secondary highways from large numbers of large trucks involved
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lem as they seek to respond to millions of tons of metropolitan
waste in search of a final resting place. The amount of garbage generated in urban areas is staggering. 2 ' The direct and indirect costs
of transporting and disposing of this waste is enormous,' 2 ' and the
level of concern among those living in areas targeted as dumping
grounds for big city waste has reached a fever pitch in many
22

communities. 1

Indeed, it is the incredibly lucrative aspect of the garbage disposal
issue that legitimizes, to some degree, the free-trade spin placed by
the Court on state attempts to regulate garbage disposal. The current rate paid by municipalities in the urban Northeast corridor for
123
garbage disposal runs from $40 to $70 dollars a ton.
An example of this phenomena is a landfill proposed for a remote
area of southern West Virginia. A proposal was made to dispose of
300,000 tons of garbage per month at a 10,000 acre site dotted with
unreclaimed strip and underground coal mines. If it had become
operational, the annual gross income generated at that McDowell
County dump would have approached $216,000,000.124
The McDowell County dump proposal triggered significant statewide conflict. McDowell County, suffering from major economic
decline attendant a shrinking coal industry, is receptive to any form
of "economic development" which might offer a reprieve from what
in long-distance garbage hauling, devaluation of property values, and disincentives to
economic development.
120 Americans generated about 160 million tons of municipal solid waste in 1988.
Experts predict that Americans will produce 190 million tons of trash in the year 2000.
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE TASK FORCE, UNITED STATES EPA, THE SOLID WASTE
DILEMMA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 1 (1989).
121 "In the Northeast, where landfill space is generally more scarce than in other
parts of the country, waste disposal fees are as high as $70 per ton, compared to as little
as $11.50 per ton in states in which adequate landfill space still exists." Jonathan P.
Meyers, Note, Confronting the Garbage Crisis: Increased Federal Involvement as a
Means of Addressing Municipal Solid Waste Disposal, 79 GEO. L.J. 567, 573 (1990-91)
(citing States News Service, Jan. 25, 1990).
22
1 See supra note 11.
123 See, e.g., Evergreen Waste Systems, Inc. v. Metropolitan Service Dist., 820 F.2d
1482 (9th Cir. 1987); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1194 (6th Cir.
1981), remanded on other grounds, 455 U.S. 931 (1982); Harvey v. Delaware Solid
Waste Auth., 600 F. Supp. 1369, 1379 (D. Del. 1985); Shayne Bros. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (D.D.C. 1984); Glassboro v. Gloucester County, 495
A.2d 49 (N.J.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1008 (1985); In re Long-Term Out-of-State Waste
Disposal Agreement Between the County of Hunterdon and Glendon Energy Co., 568
A.2d 547 (Pa. 1990).
124 Assuming a $60 per ton dumping fee. See Peter T. Kilborn, Dying Town Considers Salvation in a Landfill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1991, at 20; Rudy Abramson, Backlash
Over Trash Export Grows, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, at 28A.
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seems an inexorable downward economic spiral to the depths of depression. Other West Virginia communities have also been targeted
as likely depositories for the waste of Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
and New York. The majority of West Virginians clamor for protection from what they view as an onslaught of out-of-state garbage
which threatens both their quality of life and environment.
The concerns of West Virginians are mirrored in numerous states
across the nation. State legislature after state legislature has sought
to limit or block the importation of garbage from urban areas in
other states. State enactments to discourage disposal of out-of-state
wastes have taken various forms: imposition of prohibitions at the
state or local level;' 25 restrictions through reciprocity agreements; 126 enactment of fees that generally require higher payments
for wastes generated outside the enacting state; 127 and restrictions
on the use of landfill space. One by one, with only a few exceptions,1 28 these state measures have been invalidated by federal and
state courts using the strict standard of judicial review established
29
in dormant Commerce Clause cases.'
Invalidation of these state measures has occurred even though, in
most of these jurisdictions, the legislative motive is not economic
protectionism. The primary motive is to protect quality of life and
the environment. Any impact on interstate commerce is, in most
cases, truly incidental. However, the impact on federalism and separation of powers principles is significant indeed, suggesting a com125See Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 939 F.2d 941 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding unconstitutional county resolution banning importation of waste from other
counties); supra note 12.
126See, e.g., Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1127 (1990); Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs.
v. Bayh, 734 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp.
1204 (D.R.I. 1987).
127 IND. CODE ANN. § 13-9.5-5-1 (West Supp. 1990); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3734.57(A) (Anderson 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-56-170(c), (e), 44-56-510 (Law
Co-op. 1988 Supp).
128 See, e.g., Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d 1482
(9th Cir. 1987).
129See, e.g., Shayne Bros. v. Prince George's County, 556 F. Supp. 182 (D. Md.
1983) (county ordinance prohibiting disposal of out-of-state waste without prior consent
of local officials violates commerce clause); Industrial Waste Serv. Inc. v. Moore, 677 F.
Supp. 436 (S.D.W.Va. 1987) (executive order directing state Department of Natural
Resources to deny a license to any solid waste facility receiving out-of-state waste invalidated on Commerce Clause grounds); see also Stephen D. Devito, Jr. Trucking v.
Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Comm'n, 770 F. Supp. 775 (D.R.I.) aff'd 947
F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991); National Solid Waste Management Assn. v. Alabama Dep't
of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1990).

Trashing the Constitution

pelling reason to curtail judicial activism under the dormant
Commerce Clause.
B. Strict Dormant Commerce Clause Scrutiny of State Attempts
to Ban Importation of Garbage
Federal and state court decisions invalidating laws regulating
transportation and disposal of out-of-state trash have adhered to a
course charted by a 1978 dormant Commerce Clause decision of the
Supreme Court. In City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 130 the Court
applied the Commerce Clause to a state statute that prohibited importation of out-of-state solid waste. The Court held that the state
law violated the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause.
City of Philadelphia, recently reaffirmed in Fort GratiotSanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Departmentof Natural Resources,',' provides the basis for analyzing state attempts to deal with problems of
importation and disposal of out-of-state garbage. City of Philadelphia also provides a microcosmic view of how judicial activism pursuant to the negative implications of the Commerce Clause runs
counter to principles of participatory democracy, federalism, and
separation of powers. In that case, a New Jersey law "prohibited
the importation of most 'solid or liquid waste which originated or
was collected outside the territorial limits of the State.' "'32 Thus,
apart from narrow exceptions, New Jersey closed its borders to all
wastes from other states.' 33
130437 U.S. 617 (1978).
131 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992); see also Chemical Waste Management Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S.
Ct. 2009 (1992).
132 437 U.S. at 618 (quoting chapter 363 of 1973 N.J. Laws).
133 The case involved chapter 363 of 1973 N.J. Laws (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 13.1 1-10 (West Supp. 1978)), which provides, in pertinent part:
No person shall bring into this state any solid or liquid waste which originated
or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State, except garbage to be
fed to swine in the State of New Jersey, until the commissioner [of the State
Department of Environmental Protection] shall determine that such action
can be permitted without endangering the public health, safety and welfare
and has promulgated regulations permitting and regulating the treatment and
disposal of such wastes in this state.
In Fort GratiotSanitary Landfill, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992), the Court was faced with a
different approach to the out of state garbage problem. In 1988, the state legislature
amended the Michigan Solid Waste Management Act (MSWMA) by adding to provisions which (1) prohibited a landfill from accepting waste generated outside the county
where the landfill facility was located unless acceptance of such waste had received prior
approval in the receiving county's solid waste management plan, MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 299.413a (West Supp. 1991); and (2) required that before a disposal facility
could "serve the disposal needs of another county, state, or country, the service . . .
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Immediately affected by this prohibition were operators of private
landfills in New Jersey and several cities in other states that had
waste disposal agreements with those operators. 34 They brought
suit against New Jersey in state court, attacking the statute and regulations as violative of the Commerce Clause. The New Jersey
Supreme Court upheld the statutory prohibition.' 3 5
New Jersey argued that interstate movement of garbage was not
commerce within the meaning of the Commerce Clause. 36 The
Supreme Court of the United States disagreed, holding that inter37
state transportation of solid waste is, indeed, commerce.'
must be explicitly authorized in the approved solid waste management plan of the receiving county." Id. § 299.430(2).
Thus, unlike the New Jersey statute in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the
MSWMA did not focus exclusively on out of state garbage shipments, nor did it impose
a flat ban on disposal of wastes from outside the county or from outside of Michigan.
The ultimate result, however-the invalidation of state law on dormant Commerce
Clause grounds-was the same in both cases.
134 In Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, the sole plaintiff was the landfill operator who
had been denied authority to accept 1,750 tons per day of out-of-state garbage by the
county solid waste planning committee. Because the county's waste management plan
did not authorize the acceptance of any out-of-county waste, the Supreme Court viewed
the Michigan law as "effectively prevent[ing] petitioner from receiving any solid waste
that does not originate in St. Clair County." 112 S. Ct. at 2022. The Court noted,
however, that the Michigan statute did permit individual counties to accept out-of-state
waste if they so desired. Id. at 2023.
135Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth.,
348 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1975) (consolidated opinion). Similarly, the United States District
Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the Michigan law reviewed
in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill. See Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan
Dep't of Natural Resources, 732 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Mich. 1990), aff'd, 931 F.2d 413
(6th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 857 (1992).
136 Hackensack, 348 A.2d at 512. The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with this
argument. In its opinion in Hackensack, the court wrote, "commodities or substances
injurious to the public health are not 'articles of commerce' within the meaning of the
constitutional phrase. Their lack of market value coupled with their immediate threat
to human health dictates that such substances not be afforded the protection of the
Commerce Clause." Id. at 513.
137The Court explained:
We think the state court misread our cases, and thus erred in assuming that
they require a two-tiered definition of commerce. In saying that innately
harmful articles "are not legitimate subjects of trade and commerce," the Bowman Court was stating its conclusion, not the starting point of its reasoning.
All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset. In Bowman and similar cases, the Court
held simply that because the articles' worth in interstate commerce was far
outweighed by the dangers inhering in their very movement, States could prohibit their transportation across state lines. Hence, we reject the state court's
suggestion that the banning of "valueless" out-of-state wastes by ch. 363 implicates no constitutional protection. Just as Congress has power to regulate
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The Supreme Court also rejected New Jersey's argument that its
law was similar to a quarantine law rather than an economic protec38
tion measure.'
In reaching its ultimate decision, the Court emphasized that the
Commerce Clause was intended to prevent state economic
protectionism:
This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone
has the gamut of powers necessary to control the economy including the vital power of erecting customs barriers against foreign competition, has as its corollary that the states are not
separable economic units .... "What is ultimate is the principle
that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in
a position of economic isolation."
The opinions of the court through the years have reflected an
alertness to the evils of "economic isolation" and protectionism
139

The Supreme Court then utilized its first level of dormant Commerce Clause analysis:
Thus, where simple economic protectionism is effected by state
legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.
The clearest example of such legislation is a law that overtly
blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State's borders...
The crucial inquiry, therefore, must be directed to determining
whether [the New Jersey law] is basically a protectionist meathe interstate movement of these wastes, States are not free from constitutional scrutiny when they restrict that movement.

City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622-23.
138 Id. at 629. The Court observed that:
The harms caused by waste are said to arise after its disposal in landfill sites,
and at that point, as New Jersey concedes, there is no basis to distinguish outof-state waste from domestic waste. If one is inherently harmful, so is the
other. Yet New Jersey has banned the former while leaving its landfill sites
open to the latter. The New Jersey law blocks importation of waste in an
obvious effort to saddle those outside the State with the entire burden of slowing the flow of refuse into New Jersey's remaining landfill sites. That legislative effort is clearly impermissible under the Commerce Clause ....
Id.; see also Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992), wherein the
Court rejected a similar quarantine argument regarding a state's right to attempt to
regulate importation of out-of-state hazardous wastes by a taxing mechanism that imposed higher fees on out-of-state wastes than on similar wastes generated within the
state.
139 City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 623 (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond,
336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949)) (citations omitted). In Fort GratiotSanitary Landfill, the
Court quoted this language of City of Philadelphia with approval, observing that the
Michigan law's restrictions on waste import from outside a county "authorize each of
its 83 counties to isolate itself from the national economy." 112 S. Ct. at 2024.
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sure, or whether it can be fairly viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that
are only incidental.'4°
The Supreme Court analyzed the language of the New Jersey statute using this strict standard of judicial review.' 4 '
New Jersey argued strenuously that its law was intended to protect the state's environment. 42 Philadelphia disagreed, contending
that the New Jersey law "is actually no more than a legislative efthe cost of solid waste
fort to suppress competition and stabilize
' 43
disposal for New Jersey residents."'
140 City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624 (citations omitted).
141However, the review standard stated in Fort GratiotSanitary Landfill was stated
in a different form: "A state statute that clearly discriminates against interstate commerce is therefore unconstitutional 'unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified
by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism.' " 112 S. Ct. at 2024-25 (quoting
New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988)). While facially less strict than
the per se standard of City of Philadelphia, the test utilized in Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill appears extremely strict as applied therein.
142 The Court found the purpose underlying New Jersey's prohibition to be set forth
in the statute itself as follows:
The legislature finds and determines that . . . the volume of solid and liquid
waste continues to rapidly increase, that the treatment and disposal of these
wastes continues to pose an even greater threat to the quality of the environment of New Jersey, that the available and appropriate land fill sites within
the State are being diminished, that the environment continues to be
threatened by the treatment and disposal of waste which originated or was
collected outside the State, and that the public health, safety and welfare require that the treatment and disposal within this state of all wastes generated
outside of the State be prohibited.
City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 625 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13.1 1-10 (West Supp.
1978)). Michigan made the same argument in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, but attempted to distinguish the underlying purpose of its law from that which the Supreme
Court had found to motivate the New Jersey law in City of Philadelphia: "Michigan
and St. Clair County . . . argue that this case is different from [City of] Philadelphiav.
New Jersey because the SWMA constitutes a comprehensive health and safety regulation rather than 'economic protectionism' of the state's limited landfill capacity." 112
S. Ct. at 2026. The Court rejected Michigan's argument almost out-of-hand "[b]ecause
those provisions unambiguously discriminate against interstate commerce." Id. at
2027. Expanding on what appears to be a departure from the City of Philadelphia review standard, the Court found that Michigan had failed to satisfy "the burden of proving that [the Michigan law's provisions] cannot be adequately served by
nondiscriminatory alternatives." Id. This requirement is part of the second level which
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., applied to state laws that are not per se invalid. 397 U.S.
137, 143 (1986). In Fort GratiotSanitary Landfill, the Court inexplicably seems to have
run Pike's two tier analysis together.
143 City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 626. New Jersey was apparently experiencing
shortages of landfill space, and it was alleged by those challenging the law that "while
outwardly cloaked 'in the currently fashionable garb of environmental protection,' . ..
[i]t is actually no more than a legislative effort to suppress competition and stabilize the
cost of solid waste disposal for New Jersey residents." Id. at 625-26. Philadelphia cited
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The Court found that this dispute over the ultimate legislative
purpose behind the New Jersey statute need not be resolved.'" It
said that "the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means
as well as legislative ends."' 4 5 Therefore, the Court held:
Whatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming
from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from
their origin, to treat them differently. Both on its face and in its
plain effect [the New
Jersey law] violates this principle of
46
nondiscrimination.

1

The Court also mentioned its decisions which held that a state
may not give its own inhabitants a preferred right of access over
consumers in other states to natural resources located within its
47

borders. 1

legislative history which suggested the problem addressed by the legislature was primar-

ily financial: blocking the flow of out-of-state waste into certain landfill sites would
extend their lives, thus delaying the day when New Jersey cities would transport their
waste to more distant and expensive sites. Id. at 626.
No similar shortage of landfill space was identified as a motivating factor underlying
the enactment of the Michigan law reviewed by the Court in Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill. The Court, however, found that "local waste producers [were afforded] complete protection from competition from out-of-state waste producers who seek to use
local waste disposal areas." 112 S. Ct. at 2024. Advancing this interest of "local waste
producers" in St. Clair County is the only element of state "economic protectionism"
that the Court is able to identify in its opinion.
144 The Court assumed that New Jersey could enact legislation to protect both the
environment and the wallets of its citizens. It could not, however, accomplish this by
discriminating against out-of-state interests. City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 626-27.
45
1 Id. at 626 (emphasis added). The Court noted a number of such situations where
economic protectionism was proved by establishing that a statute has a discriminatory
purpose or effect. See also Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2015
(1992). Compare Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977) (initial burden to demonstrate discrimination on party attacking the state regulation) with Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (once discrimination shown
to exist, burden falls on state to justify regulation both in terms of the local benefits
provided and unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives).
146 City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27. The opinion stated:
The Court has consistently found parochial legislation of this kind to be
constitutionally invalid, whether the ultimate aim of the legislation was to assure a steady supply of milk by erecting barriers to allegedly ruinous outside
competition, or to create jobs by keeping industry within the State, or to preserve the State's financial resources from depletion by fencing out indigent
immigrants. In each of these cases, a presumably legitimate goal was sought
to be achieved by the illegitimate means of isolating the State from the national economy.
Id. at 627 (citations omitted).
147 See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). These cases stand for the basic principle that "[a] state is
without power to prevent privately owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold
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The Supreme Court emphasized that the New Jersey law imposed
on out-of-state commercial interests the full burden of conserving
the state's remaining landfill sites. The state had "overtly moved to
slow or freeze the flow of commerce for protectionist reasons....
What is crucial is the attempt by one state to isolate itself from a
problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade."14
The statute, said the Court, "blocks the importation of waste in
an obvious effort to saddle those outside the State with the entire
burden of slowing the flow of refuse into New Jersey's remaining
landfill sites."' 4 9 That legislative effort was held "impermissible
under the Commerce Clause.""'
C.

The Dormant Commerce Clause and Free Trade in Trash:
Lessons of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey

In City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, the Court found the New
Jersey law to be discriminatory on its face. The New Jersey statute
flatly prohibited importation of out-of-state garbage and thus created an overt barrier to interstate commerce. The balancing tests of
Pike v. Bruce Church were not applied because of the New Jersey
laws' facial invalidity.' 5'
Given the mounting volume of trash flowing across state lines,
City of Philadelphia left states groping for a means by which to control the garbage inflow consistent with the dormant Commerce
Clause. Numerous state laws have been enacted only to be struck
down by federal and state courts citing City of Philadelphia.152
Those courts have followed City of Philadelphia in rejecting environmental protection as justification for bans of out-of-state garbage, finding a flat prohibition of importation to be invalid no
in interstate commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy local demands or
because they are needed by the people of the State." Foster Fountain Packing Co. v.
Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928).
148 City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628. The Court identified arguments that were
not made in the case: "There has been no claim here that the very movement of waste
into or through New Jersey endangers health, or that waste must be disposed of as soon
and as close to its point of generation as possible." Id. at 629.
149 Id. (emphasis added). As explained below, the Court's conclusion that out-ofstate interests would absorb the full burden of conserving landfill space was not an
accurate conclusion. See discussion infra note 155 and accompanying text.
150 City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628.
151 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
152 See discussion supra note 14.
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matter what state goals motivated enactment.
The Court's analysis of both the state interest advanced by the
New Jersey statute and the free trade interest purportedly affected
by that law is demonstrably flawed. For example, the Court's finding that the New Jersey initiative was protectionist is obviously
wrong. New Jersey private interests had just as much to gain, in an
economic sense, as Philadelphia-based garbage hauling companies.
In such situations, the bulk of the monies collected for the disposal
of trash is pocketed by disposal companies, not truckers. The extent of the loss of revenues to New Jersey disposal site operators
and their New Jersey resident employees would have run into the
hundreds of millions of dollars.' 5 4 Moreover, even uniform state
and local taxes on such disposal would have generated millions of
dollars of tax revenues for New Jersey state government. Moreover,
the larger landfills which such state laws discourage are more economical to operate. By limiting landfill size, New Jersey increased
disposal 55costs to in-state disposal facility operators and local
citizens. .
When one notes the significant economic loss that New Jersey
companies, residents and state government would have experienced

153 In an analogous situation in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, observed: "If anything, the challenged regulation seems likely to work
to Michigan's economic disadvantage. This is because, by limiting potential disposal
volumes for any particular site, various fixed costs will have to be recovered across
smaller volumes, increasing disposal costs for Michigan consumers." 112 S. Ct. at 2029
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Cf. Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct.
2009 (1992).
154 See discussion of the cost of garbage disposal supra note 120 and accompanying
text; see also Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, 112 S. Ct. at 2019. Cf. Chemical Waste
Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
155 In Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, which reaffirmed City of Philadelphia, the
Court similarly found no valid reason, apart from the place of origin of the trash, to
limit out-of-state garbage disposal in Michigan. The Court thus concluded that the
state law was a "protectionist" measure. 112 S. Ct. at 2027. Chief Justice Rehnquist
however, found that the Michigan law was not "the stuff of which economic protectionism is made." Id. at 2029 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Rehnquist rejected the majority's view of the Michigan statute as "protectionist," in light of strong evidence to the
contrary:
The regulation also will require some Michigan counties-those that until
now have been exporting their waste to other locations in the State-to confront environmental and other risks that they previously have avoided. Commerce Clause concerns are at their nadir when a state act works in this
fashion-raising prices for all the State's consumers, and working to the substantial disadvantage of other segments of the State's population-because in
these circumstances "a State's own political processes will serve as a check
against unduly burdensome regulations."
Id. (quoting Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444, n.18 (1978)).
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had the Court upheld the state law, the Court's suggestion that City
of Philadelphia was a simple case of state economic protectionism
seems significantly at odds with reality.156 While the New Jersey
statute was in a sense protectionist in nature, that protectionism
was primarily based on valid environmental concerns, not on a desire to advance in-state economic interests.
Assuming, arguendo, that New Jersey's law discriminated
against interstate commerce for economic protectionist reasons, no
similar economic protectionist motive is present in states (unlike
New Jersey) which have abundant land for trash disposal. Indeed,
it is those states with significant land availability that are most frequently targeted by garbage disposal companies and haulers seeking
1 57
a dumping ground.

Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill recognized the significant state's rights issue implicit in approaches states take--or do not take-to deal with wastes generated
by their own citizens:
[T]he laws of economics suggest that landfills will sprout in
places where land is cheapest and population densities least. 158 I
see no reason in the Commerce Clause, however, that requires
cheap-land states to become the repositories for their brethern,
thereby suffering the many risks that such sites present.159
At this juncture it is appropriate to say a few words about the
constitutionally protected right of "free-trade" which is protected
by City of Philadelphia and its progeny. Juxtaposed against state
56

1 Id.
157 The courts have failed to note this significant departure from the scenario of City
of Philadelphia, choosing instead to blindly invoke "economic protectionism" and "per
se invalidity" as the talismanic language which justifies striking down state laws.
158 Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Christopher Alm, Not in My Backyard: Facingthe
Siting Question, 10 EPA J., Oct. 1984, at 8. 112 S.Ct. at 2030 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). "Not in my back yard" is the motivation for those who prefer to export their own
trash to other states rather than take responsibility for a problem of their own making.
The Chief Justice emphasized Alm's point that each county should accept a fair share of
the overall waste stream equivalent to what it generates, so that "less populated counties," in Alm's words, "are protected against becoming the dumping ground of the entire region." Id.
159 112 S.Ct. at 2030 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The Chief Justice observed that
[t]he Court... penalizes the State of Michigan for what to all appearances are
its good faith efforts, in turn encouraging each State to ignore the waste problem in the hope that another will pick up the slack. The Court's approach
fails to recognize that the latter option is one that is quite real and quite attractive for many States ..
Id. at 2030-31.
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environmental concerns over the inflow of massive amounts of trash
is this free-trade right which advances the interests of trash haulers,
garbage dump operators, and citizens who generate garbage but
want to dump it as far from their homes as possible. 16
Thanks to City of Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, citizens and states can isolate themselves from a problem common to every state. The simple expedient used is paying to have the
problem hauled to someone else's backyard. Under the rule of these
cases a state legislature possesses few options in seeking to protect
its citizens from the serious problems attendant to massive deposition of garbage and hazardous wastes. Perhaps the most cherished
of "state's rights" under our federal system-the right to exercise
police powers to protect public health and safety-is sacrificed by
the Court on the constitutional alter to advance private economic
"free-trade" interests.1 61 Interestingly, neither the Court in City of
Philadelphia, nor the lower courts which have subsequently invalidated state laws attempting to regulate out-of-state trash, have recognized that such enactments advance an important national
162
interest. The Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
indicates a congressional preference for recovery of recyclable
materials from garbage. RCRA encourages states to devise plans
for recycling waste materials which can have the effect of signifi160 The only way to interpret the Court's holding in City of Philadelphia is that it
deems the rights of corporations engaged in interstate garbage hauling and disposal
(and the desire of citizens to avoid the consequences of disposing of their own garbage
near their homes) to be a form of "trade" of constitutional dimension. See Dennis v.
Higgins, 111 S. Ct. 865, 871 (1991). Ironically, the "free trade" in trash that the Court
so solicitously seeks to protect is itself symptomatic of economic isolationism. In an
analogous situation involving one state's attempt to regulate disposal of out-of-state
hazardous waste rather than trash, Chief Justice Rehnquist probed to the essence of the
matter:
[T]he Court today gets it exactly backward when it suggests that Alabama is
attempting to "isolate itself from a problem common to the several States."
To the contrary, it is the 34 States that have no hazardous waste facility whatsoever, not to mention the remaining 15 States with facilities all smaller than
[the Alabama disposal site], that have isolated themselves.
Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2018 (1992) (citations omitted).
161 Disturbingly, the "trade" which the Court protects is not "trade" in any commonly accepted commercial sense of the word-rather it involves the sale and transportation of the environmental health and safety problems attendant garbage.
Irresponsible citizens and legislators in some states now possess a constitutionally protected right to literally dump their problems on citizens of other states-and state governments stripped of an essential attribute of sovereignty, have few options left open to
them.
162 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6987 (1992).
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cantly reducing the amount of material that must be disposed of in
landfills or by other means.
In enacting RCRA, Congress specifically acknowledged that
while problems of waste disposal have become national in scope,
"the collection and disposal of solid wastes should continue to be
primarily the function of State, regional, and local agencies." 163
The avowed purpose of Subtitle D of the Act was to authorize and
encourage states to develop waste management plans within federal
guidelines." 4 The statute directs the Environmental Protection
' 165
Agency to establish "guidelines for identification of regions."
Thus, RCRA provides detailed guidelines to assist states in developing state waste management plans which take i,1to account extensive and detailed local factors. Given Congress' recognition that
state planning is a matter of local concern, and the detail with
which the EPA specified the many items to be considered in developing a plan, it seems absurd to suggest that Congress did not in163 Id. § 690 1(a)(4). This section of the statute is consistent with the preamble of the
EPA municipal waste landfill regulations: "The actual planning and direct implementation of solid waste programs under Subtitle D, however, remain largely State and local
functions, and the act authorizes States to devise programs to deal with State-specific
conditions and needs." Solid Wast Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50979 (October 9, 1991).
164 The original House Report states:
It is the committee's intent that the federal government will provide the technical assistance necessary for the states, in cooperation with their own local
governments, to develop an adequate regional system and the ability to implement such a system for the disposal of waste, without the federal government
becoming additionally involved in the affairs of state or local government. It
is the responsibility of the state and local government regional authorities to
decide which discarded material functions will be state or regional agency or
local responsibilities.
H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238,
6278. RCRA requirements for state plans are set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 6942.
165 42 U.S.C. § 6942(a). "Such guidelines shall consider-(1) the size and location of
areas which should be included, (2) the volume of solid waste which should be included,
and (3) the available means of coordinating regional planning with other related regional planning and for coordination of such regional planning into the State plan." Id.
Congress directed EPA to establish State planning guidelines that consider numerous
local conditions:
(1) the varying regional, geologic, hydrologic, climatic, and other circumstances under which different solid waste practices are required in order to
insure the reasonable protection of the quality of the ground and surface waters from leachate contamination, the reasonable protection of the quality of
the surface waters from surface runoff contamination, and the reasonable protection of ambient air quality;
(2) characteristics and conditions of collection, storage, processing, and disposal operating methods, techniques and practices, and location of facilities
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tend that a state be permitted to regulate waste flow as part of its
plan. Otherwise, a state plan following RCRA's mandate would
have little value.
A plan which rationally projects waste management needs within
the state for a specific time period would be easily undone because it
could not account for out-of-state factors influencing future influx
of waste.166 It is impossible to estimate the capacity of waste
processing facilities and disposal facilities needed, absent defined parameters.167 Moreover, a state plan which sets a limit on total regional disposal capacity, without the ability to determine sources of
the waste, cannot insure that such capacity will actually be available
for the region's use.
Finally, if a landfill is allowed to expand over unlimited acreage,
the community cannot rationally use traditional zoning and landuse controls to balance the competing local needs for developable
land. RCRA strongly encourages states to develop plans for managing solid waste generated in-state; it is unlikely that Congress intended to allow the divestment of such an integral state function.
A state's waste management plan necessarily focuses on regional
and county planning and most possess the flexibiity to allow for (or
restrict) waste from other areas outside of the planning region as a
necessary corollary of the planning process, a result fully consistent
with Congressional intent. 168 The need for planning parameters
where such operating methods, techniques, and practices are conducted, taking into account the nature of the material to be disposed;
(4) population density, distribution and projected growth;
(5) geographic, geologic, climatic, and hydrologic characteristics;
(8) the constituents and generation rates of waste;
(9) the political, economic, organizational, financial and management
problems affecting comprehensive solid waste management;
42 U.S.C. § 6942(c). The guidelines for state planning were issued in 1979 and appear
at 40 C.F.R. § 256 (1992).
166 For example, a planning region that generates 2000 tons per day of solid waste
may plan to handle 2000 tons or it may choose to plan to handle 500 or 5000 tons per
day within the region; but it simply cannot "plan" to dispose of an unknown quantity.
167 Similarly, the lifespan of a landfill whose capacity is measured in thousands of
cubic yards cannot be estimated unless daily intake at the facility is known or can rationally be projected. Future capacity at a landfill cannot be guaranteed unless a daily
inflow limit is set.
168 RCRA provides that states may elect to establish interstate regional planning
areas:
In the case of any region which, pursuant to the guidelines published by the
Administrator under section 6942(a) of this title (relating to identification of
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does not require each planning area to set a limit of zero waste imports from other regions; but some limit must be set, and logically
the size of that limit should be determined by local conditions.
Thus, it seems obvious that state laws that regulate or flatly ban
importation of out-of-state trash further the national goal of reducing the amount of disposable wastes. When a state cannot export
massive amounts of garbage its own citizens have generated, those
citizens will face the option of high landfill disposal fees or moving
expeditiously toward RCRA's goal of reducing disposable wastes by
recycling.
Unfortunately, the Court's decision in City of Philadelphia has
provided a significant disincentive to state recovery and recycling
efforts preferred by RCRA. With the hands of state regulators
crudely tied by strands of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,
abundant in-state landfill space serves as a magnet attracting out of
state wastes. In land rich states, attempts to reduce the volume of
landfilled wastes by promoting recycling and recovery is thus
thwarted. It seems rather obvious, given human nature, that as
long as there is a place to dump garbage away from home-so that
it is a problem to be confronted by others-neither citizens nor government officials will press for realization of recovery and recycling
goals set by RCRA.
By applying dormant Commerce Clause theory in City of Philadelphia, the Court has made what is essentially a legislative policy
judgment. Consequently, large urban states, wallowing in a mire of
their own trash, are permitted to thrust it on citizens of other states
by the simple expedient of loading garbage on trucks or rail cars
and hauling the content across state lines. In so doing, these urban
states need not come to grips with problems of their own making.
The Commerce Clause, then, is used as a device to export both environmental and political problems to neighboring states all in the
name of free-trade rights of trash generators, collectors, haulers,
and disposers. One must wonder whether the framers could have
envisioned such a use of the commerce power they delegated solely
regions), would be located in two or more States, the Governors of the respective States, after consultation with local elected officials, shall consult, cooperate, and enter into agreements identifying the boundaries of such region
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 6946(c)(1). The EPA guidelines read: "The State plan shall provide for
coordination, where practicable, with solid waste management plans in neighboring
States. 40 C.F.R. § 256.50(m); see also 42 U.S.C. § 6904.
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to Congress. 69
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court eschews intense judicial review in economic
substantive due process and equal protection cases, has withdrawn
from exercising general federal common law powers, and has rejected judicially crafted remedies where Congress' commerce power
intrudes on state sovereignty. In the dormant Commerce Clause
context, the Court plays a dramatically different role, using intrusive strict judicial review standards to evaluate the impact of state
and local laws on commerce among the states.
Further, the Court refuses to defer to state sovereignty where
there is little or no evidence of state economic protectionism. The
Court thus chooses to place a higher priority on rights of free trade.
When the Court strikes down a state or local law where Congress is
silent, the Court is setting legislative policy. It ignores the importance of the structural allocation of power under the Constitution
which recognizes citizens' right to shape legislative policy through
169 Those who hear the silent Commerce Clause calling for judicial intervention have
a response. If the Court makes a mistake in assessing the extent to which a state's law
may impact on interstate commerce, Congress can trump the judicial decision by enacting legislation authorizing such state action. This "Congress will make it right if we
err" approach is, however, as suspect as the judicial exercise of the legislative power to
regulate commerce. It seems exceedingly unlikely that Congress will step in to return
power to one state or one city after a federal court has found an enactment unduly
burdens commerce.
As others have cogently argued, overcoming congressional inertia presents a nearly
insurmountable task when an isolated statute, regulation, or ordinance is at issue and a
court has found it to impermissibly burden national interests. See Redish & Nugent,
supra note 43, at 592-93. It seems obvious that such inertia may be overcome more
readily when a law so heavily burdens commerce that affected states persuade or are
likely to pressure their congressional representatives to lift the burden.
Justice Powell's dissent in Garcia comes to mind when appraising the "Congress as
trump card" argument of dormant Commerce Clause adherents. See supra text accompanying note 85; see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
576 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting). With literally hundreds of bills being drafted by
congressional staffers and where "even the most conscientious legislators" find it "virtually impossible ... to be truly familiar with many of the statutes enacted," it appears
unrealistic to expect that judicial overreaching under the dormant Commerce Clause
will be identified and restrained by Congress. Id.
Indeed, there are few examples of situations where Congress has trumped the Court,
nullifying judicial dormant Commerce Clause decisions. On the other hand, there are
myriad examples of Congress preempting state laws seen to discriminate or otherwise
burden commerce. The wide sweep of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause touched and tackled such serious mid-century problems as old age, the environment, race and gender discrimination, and crime. In each case, Congress purportedly
acted to curtail discrimination in or undue burdens on commerce.
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the political/legislative process. 170
While judicial exercise of power under the dormant Commerce
Clause has practical advantages, it is inconsistent with the Constitution's structural allocation of power. The Court should, but is unlikely to, declare itself unwilling to continue its practice of judicially
regulating commerce. If it were to make such a declaration, the
initial responsibility for dealing with state measures which allegedly
discriminate against or otherwise burden interstate commerce
would reside initially in Congress as the Constitution literally contemplates. It would be Congress' prerogative to decide whether a
particular state's action so impedes the flow of commerce that it
should be nullified. Congress could enact legislation which would
modify or preempt the state law if it believed such action was necessary to protect free trade. On the other hand, Congress might decide that a particular burden is not so inimical to the national
interest that it should be preempted. Congress, when placed in this
posture of responsibility, may choose to advance national or state
goals that it believes are of higher priority than protection of free
trade. 171
Of course the suggestion that Congress and not the courts have
the responsibility of reacting to alleged discrimination and unreasonable burdens resulting from state and local laws has been attacked by the courts and commentators as unworkable and inviting
economic chaos. They believe Congress could not effectively respond to local restraints that are
[i]ndividually too petty, too diversified, and too local to get the
attention of a Congress hard pressed with more urgent matters ....

The sluggishness of government, the multitude of mat-

ters that clamor for attention, and the relative ease with which
men are persuaded to postpone troublesome decisions, all make
170 While it is perfectly logical for Congress to preempt state laws that unduly burden
commerce, any such legislative decision must inevitably implicate the political protection afforded states by the structure of the federal government-the voice of the states
heard through their elected representatives and an executive chosen by a state-influenced electoral college. Under the extant dormant Commerce Clause approach, state
and local interests have no chance to influence the Court in the political sense because
the Court, rather than the Congress, decides whether to preempt a state law burdening
free-trade interests.
171 With the admonition of Garcia ringing in my ears, I find it difficult to square the
judicial remedy of dormant Commerce Clause theory with the importance the Court
has ascribed to political remedies it finds implicit in the structure of governance under
constitutional federalism principles. If a state-imposed burden on commerce is significant in a constitutional sense, Garcia tells us that Congress will pass a law regulating or
pre-empting state action.

Trashing the Constitution

inertia one of the most decisive powers in determining the course
of our affairs and frequently gives to the established order of
things a longevity and vitality much beyond its merits. 172
The straightforward response to this contention is that Congress
is left to do precisely what the Commerce Clause has instructed it to
do.
It is equally plausible, however, that Congress might conclude
that the way the Court is currently handling cases involving impediments to commerce is the most appropriate way in a complex society to attack such problems and yet maintain free trade among the
states. By the same token, Congress might conclude the states
should have more flexibility in fashioning responses to health,
safety, and welfare issues. The nation would be better served, I submit, by a political process that puts the burden on the people and
legislatures rather than the courts to deal with local and state laws
impacting interstate commerce.
It is important to appreciate that while Congress could choose a
case by case response to each instance of alleged state or local interference with interstate commerce, it also has the option of taking a
more generic approach. Legislation identifying a federal "free
trade" cause of action and granting standing to citizens to bring
such an action could be enacted. Such a cause of action would
arise, for example, when the claim is made that (1) a particular activity is in the flow of interstate commerce, (2) the activity is the
focus of discriminatory regulation or (3) taxation, (4) favoring instate interests, or (5) where such commercial activity is unduly burdened by the regulation. Congress could direct the courts to apply
the same standard of judicial review the Supreme Court uses today
in dormant Commerce Clause cases or Congress could require the
courts to apply a more or a less deferential standard of judicial
review.
The simple logic of transferring the commerce power from courts
to Congress is that it would be totally consistent with the text of the
Constitution. Congress would be regulating commerce among the
states. The courts would decide issues relating to state interference
with commerce on the basis of positive law. Individual citizens
would regain the opportunity to influence the political process in a
more meaningful fashion. The burden of making important policy
172 Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring); see
also Tushnet, supra note 39, at 152. But see Maltz, supra note 5, at 88.
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decisions relating to free trade and states rights in the federal system would rest precisely where the framers placed it, on Congress.
Given such a simple and effective way to square federalism, freetrade, and separation of powers principles with the structural design
of governance under our Constitution, the continuation of ad hoc
judicial policy making under the dormant Commerce Clause makes
no sense. Such judicial activism is fundamentally inconsistent with
the restraint that otherwise forms so much of the Court's modem
constitutional jurisprudence. At bottom, this activism favors private economic rather than more important state and national interests. This judicial elevation of a private right of "free trade"
unacceptably alters our constitutional structure, distorting federalism and separation of powers principles. I am confident that, in
time, raw judicial power exercised under the rubric of the dormant
Commerce Clause in favor of private economic interests exemplified
by City of Philadelphiawill go the way of Lochner, NationalLeague
of Cities, and Swift v. Tyson.

